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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS March 21, 1973 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your opinion 
in 72-75, Georgia v. United States. 
" \.) 
~s: 
Willi a.m. 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Stewart 





To: rho Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Just ·i ce Brennan 
Mr. Just:lce White 
Mr . Justice J.Jarshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~r. Justice Powell 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
From: Stewart , J . 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~~culated: MAR 211973 
No. 72- 75 Recirculated : ____________ __ 
Georgia et al. , Appellants, On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Northern District of 
v. 
Georgia. United States. 
[March -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Attorney General of the United States brought 
this suit under § 12 (d) of the Voting Rights Act as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j (d), to enjoin the State of 
Georgia from conducting elections for its House of Rep-
resentatives under the 1972 legislative reapportionment 
law. A three-judge federal court in the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia agreed that certain aspects of the reap-
portionment law came within the ambit of § 5 of the Act, 
42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that the State, which is sub-
ject to the provisions of§ 5,1 had not obtained prior clear-
ance from either the Attorney General or the District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, and 
without reaching the question whether the reapportion-
ment plan had the purpose or effect of "denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," 
1 A State is subj ect to § 5 if it qualifie · under § 4 (b) , 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (b) . Covered State;; arc those which on November 1, 1964, 
employed any of several enumerated tests or devices as a prerequisite 
to voting, and in which less than 50% of eligible votrrs were 
registered to vote or actually voted in the November 1964 presi-
dential election . States that meet identical crit eria wi th reRpect to 
the 1968 presidrntial election are also covered under the amended 
Act. H is stipulated that Georgia is coYered under § 4 (b). 
' . 
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42 U. S. C. § 1973c, the District Court issued the re-
quested injunction." The State brought this appeal. We 
noted probable jurisdiction, staying enforcement of the 
District Court judgment pending disposition of the ap-
peal. 409 U. S. 911. 
Following the 1970 Census, the Georgia Legislature set 
out to reapportion its State House of Representatives, 
State Senate, and federal congressional electoral districts. 
vVe are here concerned only with the reapportionment 
plan for the State House of Representatives. 3 The result 
of the Legislature's deliberations was a plan (hereinafter 
the 1971 plan) that, as compared with the prior 1968 
scheme, decreased the number of districts from 118 to 
105, and increased the number of multi-member districts 
from 47 to 49. Whereas the prior apportionment plan 
had generally preserved county lines, the 1971 plan did 
not: 31 of the 49 multi-member districts and 21 of the 
56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county 
boundaries. The boundaries of nearly all districts were 
changed, and in many instances the number of represent-
atives per district was altered. Residents of some 31 
counties formerly in single-member districts were brought 
into multi-member districts. Under continuing Georgia 
law, a candidate receiving less than a majority of the 
votes cast for a position was required to participate in 
a majority runoff election. Ga. Code § 34-1513. And in 
the multi-member districts, each candidate was required 
to designate the seat for which he was running, referred 
to as the "numbered post." Ga. Code § 34-1015. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids States sub-
ject to the Act from implementing any change in a "vot-
ing qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without 
" The decision of the District Court is umeported. 
" No objection was interposed with respect to the State Senate or 
fedeml congre8~ional districts. 
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first obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District 
Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed 
change "does not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on ac-
count of race or color," or submitting the plan to the 
Attorney General of the United States and receiving no 
objection within 60 clays. 42 U.S. C. § 1973c. Pursuant 
to this requirement, the State of Georgia submitted the 
1971 plan to the Attorney General on November 5, 1971. 
T"'o weeks later, a representative of the Department of 
Justice wrote to the State Attorney General, requesting 
further informatiou needed to assess the racial impact 
of the tendered plan:' This information was received on 
January 6, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the Attorney 
General of the United States formally objected to the 
State's plan. The objection letter cited the combination 
of multi-member districts, numbered posts, majority run-
off elections, and the extensive departure from the State's 
prior policy of adhering to county lines. On the basis 
of these changes plus particular changes in the structure 
of potential black majority single-member districts, the 
Attorney General was "unable to conclude that the plan 
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." 
The letter stated that the Attorney General therefore felt 
obligated to "interpose an objection to changes submitted 
by the reapportionment plans." 
The State Legislature immediatdy enacted a new re-
apportionment plan and repealed its predecessor. The 
1972 plan increased the number of districts from 105 to 
128, and decreased the number of multi-member districts 
• The Justice Department asked for census maps of the 1964 and 
196, House districts; the distribution of white and nonwhite popula-
tion within the 1964, 1968, nnd 1971 districts; a hi::;tor~· of the pri-
mnry and gcneml elections in which Negro ca11didatrs ran; data, 
in(·luding race, with respect to nil elected ~:>tate reprcsentati\·es; and 
the legislatil'e history of all redistricting bills. 
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from 49 to 32. Twenty-two of the multi-member districts 
and 37 of the single-member districts still crossed county 
boundaries. 
This 1972 plan \vas submitted to the Attorney General 
on March 15, and he objected on March 24. The Assist-
ant Attorney General's letter stated, in part: 
"After a careful analysis of the Act redistricting 
the Georgia House of Representatives, I must con-
clude that this reapportionment does not satis-
factorily remove the features found objectionable in 
your prior submission, namely, the combination of 
multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a ma-
jority (runoff) requirement discussed in my March 3, 
1972 letter to you interposing an objection to your 
earlier Section 5 submission. Accordingly, and for 
the reasons enunciated in my March 3, 1972 letter 
I must, on behalf of the Attorney General, object to 
S. B. 690 reapportioning the Georgia House of 
Representatives.'' 
When the Georgia Legislature resolved that it would 
take no further steps to enact a new plan, the Attorney 
General brought the present lawsuit. 
The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable 
to the 1972 House plan, both because the Act does not 
reach "reapportionment" and because the 1972 plan does 
not constitute a change from procedures "in force or effect 
on November 1, 1964." If applicable, the Act is claimed 
to be unconstitutional as applied. The State also chal-
lenges two aspects of the Attorney General's conduct of 
the § 5 objection procedure, claiming first that the At-
torney General cannot object to a state plan without find-
ing that it in fact has a discriminatory purpose or effect, 
and second that the Attorney General's objection to the 
1971 plan was not made within the 60-day time period 
allowed for objection under the Act. 
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I 
Despite the fact that multi-member districts, numbered 
posts, and a majority runoff requirement were features 
of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964, the 
changes that followed from the 1972 reapportionment are 
plainly sufficient to invoke § 5 if that section of the Act 
reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5 is not 
concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, 
but rather with the reality of changed practices as they 
affect Negro voters. It seems clear that the extensive 
reorganization of voting districts and the creation of 
multi-member districts in place of single-member districts 
in certain areas amounted to substantial departures from 
the electoral state of things under previous law. The 
real question is whether the substance of these changes 
undertaken as part of the state reapportionment are 
"standards, practices, or procedures with respect to vot-
ing" within the meaning of § 5. 
The prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion 
that changes of the sort included in Georgia's 1972 House 
reapportionment plan are cognizable under § .5. In South 
Carolina Y. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, we upheld the 
basic constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Mr. 
Justice Black dissented from that judgment, precisely 
describing the broad sweep of § 5: 
"Section 5 goes on to provide that a State covered 
by § 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or 
lavvs relating to voting without first trying to per-
suade the Attorney General of the United States or 
the Federal District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia that the new proposed laws do not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying the 
right to vote to citizens on account of their race or 
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The applicability of § 5 to election la"· changes such 
as those enacted by Georgia in its 1972 plan was all but 
conclusively established by the opinion of this Court in 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544. The 
Allen opinion, dealing with four companion cases, held 
that § 5 applied to a broad range of voting law changes, 
and was constitutional as applied. With respect to the 
reach of§ 5, we held that "[t]he legislative history on the 
whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach 
any state enactment which altered the election law of 
a covered State in even a minor way." !d., at 566. 
One of the companion cases, Fairley v. Patterson, in-
volved a claim that a change from district to at-large 
voting for county supervisor was a change in a "stand-
ard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." The 
challenged procedure was held to be covered by § 5. 
We noted that " [ t] he right to vote can be affected by a 
dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute pro-
hibition on casting a ballot. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)." In holding that § 5 reached vot-
ing law changes that threatened to dilute Negro voting 
power, and in citing Reynolds v. Sims, we implicitly 
recognized the applicability of § 5 to similar but more 
s'veeping election law changes arising from the reappor-
tionment of state legislatures. 393 U. S., at 565-566, 
583-586 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.). 
Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5 
in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. 
After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend 
the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case wa.s 
repeatedly discussed," the Act was extended for five years, 
"See, e. g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of thr House 
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4249, H. R. 553R, and Similar 
Proposals, 91st Cong., bt Sr,~., at 1, 4, 1R, 83, 130-131, 13::l, 147-
149, 154--155, 182-184, 402-454; Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on ConRtitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
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without any substantive modification of § 5. Pub. L. 
91-285, 85 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). We can only conclude, 
then, that Allen correctly interpreted the congressional 
design when it held that "the Act gives a broad interpre-
tation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting in-
cludes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.' " 
393 U. S., at 565-566. 
Another measure of the decisiveness with ·which Allen 
controls the present case is the actual practice of covered 
States since the Allen case was decided. Georgia, for ex-
ample, submitted its 1971 plan to the Attorney General 
because it clearly believed that plan was covered by § 5. 
Its submission was "made pursuant to § 5," and the State 
Attorney General explained in his submission that the 
1968 reapportionment of the Georgia House of Repre-
sentatives "was not submitted because at that time, prior 
to Allen v. Board of Elections, ... it was believed to be 
unnecessary to submit reapportionment plans to the 
United States Attorney General pursuant to the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965." When the Attorney General ob-
jected, Georgia changed its House plan and resubmitted 
it pursuant to § 5. Other States covered by the Act 
have also read Allen as controlling. The brief for the 
United States advises us that as of December 1, 1972, 
381 post-Allen reapportionment plans had been presented 
to the Attorney General by various States for § 5 approval. 
In the present posture of this case, the question is not 
whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, includ-
ing extensive shifts from single- to multi-member districts, 
on Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act, 9h;t Cong., 1~t ::md 2d 
Scss., at 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-398, 426-427, 469. David L. 
Norman, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Di-
vision, testified that, "from court decision~, all these redistricting 
plans are going to have to be submitted to the Attorney General for 
his approval because they arc voting changes." Senate Hearings, 
supra, at 507. 
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in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. 
The question, rather, is whether such changes have the 
potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and 
are within the definitional terms of ~ 5. It is beyond 
doubt that such a potential exists, cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 U. S. 124, 141-144. In view of the teaching of 
A llen,V reaffirmed in Perkins v. Mat thews, 400 U. S. 
0 The appellnnt points to lanf(un~c in the Allen opinion that, it 
s:l~'R, left open the question of the npplir~1bility of § 5 to a state 
rcnpportionmcnt law. The eited pa~sa~?;e in Allc11 is a~ follows: 
"Appellees in No. 25 [Fairley v. Pattersonl also ar~ue that 
§ 5 wns not intended to nppl~, to 11 rhnngc from district to nt-br~?;c 
votin~. because :1pplirntion of § 5 would rnu~e a conflict in the 
ndmin istrn tion of rrnpportionmcnt le~?;isln t ion. The~, ront end that 
under surh a bro:1d reading of § .5. enforcrmcnt of a reapportionment 
plan could be enjoined for failme to meet the § 5 approvnl require-
ments, 0\'Cn though the pbn h:1cl been :tppmvrd by u fcdcr:ll romt. 
Appellees mge thnt Conf(rcs~ eould not have intended to force the 
States to submit n renpportionmrnt plan to two different romts. 
"We must reject a narrow construction thnt nppellees would ~ive 
to § 5 . . . . The argument that some ndministrnti1·e problrm 
might arise in the futmc doc~ not cstnblish thnt Congress intended 
that § 5 lun·e :1 nn rrow !'<'ope; we Ira w to nnot her ruse n eonsidcra-
tion of :1ny possible conflict." 393 U.S .. at 56-t-565, 569. 
The caveat implicit in this lnn~ungr would support the nppcllnnt's 
position only if practical problems of :1dministration had emerged 
in the period that has elapsed since Allen wns decided. This docs 
not uppcnr to ht11·e been the rnsc. The brief of the Unit<.'d Stntcs 
advises us that the Department of Justice ha~ adopted prorcduiw; 
dcsi~nccl to minimize any conflicts between § 5 administrnti1·c rc1·icw 
nnd federal conrt litigation based on Fourternth or Fifteenth Amend-
ment. attacks npon state reapportionment pl:tns. 'Where n renp-
port ionment plan hns been prrsrribcd b~· federal .indicia! decree. 
the Attorne~· General does not rcvic\\· it. Sec Conner v. Johnson, 
402 U. 8. 690, 691. Where a plan has been submitted lo the Attor-
ney Gencrnl and is at the same time being litigated with respect to 
a Fifteenth Amendment claim, the Attorney General has deferred 
to the judicial determination regarding racial discrimination. Finally, 
the number of instances presenting an administrative-jndicinl overlap 
ha · been small. Of the 381 reapportionments submitted to the At-
0 0 
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379, we hold that the District Court was correct in de-
ciding that the changes enacted in the 1972 reapportion-
ment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives were 
within the ambit of ~ 5 of the Voting Rights Act. And 
for the reasons stated at length in South Carolina v. 
Kat.zenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-337, we reaffirm that the 
Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under 
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
II 
By way of implelllenting the performance of his obliga-
tion to pass on state submissions under ~ 5, the Attorney 
General has promulgated and published in the Federal 
Register certain administrative regulations, 28 CFR §51. 
The appellant claims these regulations are without legis-
lative authorization, and objects in particular to the 
application in the present case of two regulations which 
set forth the standards for decision on submissions and 
more fully define the 60-day time period provided in the 
Act. 
It is true, as the appellant contends, that§ 5 itself does 
not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any 
regulations. But ~ 5 is also silent as to the procedures the 
Attorney General is to employ in deciding whether or 
not to object to state submissions, as to the standards 
governing the contents of those submissions, and as to 
the meaning of the 60-day time period in which the At-
torney General is to object, if at all. Rather than read-
ing the statute to grant him unfettered discretion as to 
procedures, standards, and administration in this sensitive 
area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to form-
ulate and publish objective ground rules. If these regu-
lations are reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting 
Rights Act itself, then 5 U. S. C. § 301, which gives to 
torney Geneml, only 19 of the objected-to submissions were involved 
in litigation when submitted. 
0 • 
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"[tlhe head of an Executive department" the power to 
"prescribe regulations for the government of his depart-
ment, .. . [and] the distribution and performance of 
its business ... ," is surely ample legislative authority 
for the regulations. See United States Y. Morehead, 243 
U. S. 607, Smith v. United States, 170 U.S. 372. 
In 28 CFR § 51.19, the Attorney General has set forth 
the standards to be employed in deciding whether or not 
to object to a state submission. The regulation states 
that the burden of proof is on the submitting party, and 
that the Attorney General will refrain from objecting 
only if his review of the material submitted satisfies him 
that the proposed change does not have a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or effect. If he is persuaded to 
the contrary, or if he cannot within the 60-day time 
period satisfy himself that the change is without a dis-
criminatory purpose or effect, the regulation states that 
tho Attorney General will object to the submission. 7 In 
objecting to the 1971 plan, tho Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral wrote that he was "unable to conclude that the plan 
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." 
The objection letter to the 1972 plan did not specify a 
7 28 CFR § 51.19, in pertinent part, stat es that : " ... the bur-
den of proof on the submitting authority is the same in submitting 
changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes 
to the Distri ct Cout'l for the Distri ct of Columbin. . . . If the 
Attorney General is sa ti~fied that the submitted change does not 
have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect , he will not obj ect 
to the change and will so notify the submitting authority. If the 
Attorney General determines that the submit ted change has a racially 
di ~:;crimi natory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will 
so notify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the pur-
pose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attomey General 
is unable to resolYe the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall , 
consistent with t he above-described burden of proof applicable in 
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degree of certainty as to the plan's discriminatory impact,. 
but instead stated that the new plan had not remedied 
the features found objectionable in its predecessor. 
Although both objections were consistent with the 
Attorney General's regulations, the appellant in effect 
attacks the legitimacy of the regulation described above 
in contending that the Attorney General is without 
power to object unless he has actually found that the 
changes contained in a submission have a discriminatory 
purpose or effect. 
In assessing this claim, it is important to focus on the 
entire scheme of § 5. That portion of the Voting Rights 
Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered 
States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia holding that 
a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or 
effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the 
Attorney General "merely gives the covered State a rapid 
method of rendering a new state election law enforceable." 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 549. 
It is well established that in a declaratory judgment 
action under § 5, the plaintiff State has the burden of 
proo£.8 What the Attorney General's regulations do is 
to place the same burden on the submitting party in a 
§ 5 objection procedure. Though the choice of language 
in the objection letter sent to the State of Georgia was 
not a model of precision, in the context of the promul-
gated regulations the letter surely notified the State with 
sufficient clarity that it had not sustained its burden of 
8 The very effect of § 5 was to shift the burden of proof with 
respect to racial discrimination in voting. Rather than requiring 
affected parties to bring suit to challenge every changed voting 
practice, Statrs subject to § 5 were required to obtain prior clear-
ance before proposed changes could be put into effect. The burden 
of proof is on "the areas seeking relief." South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U. S. 301, 335. 
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proving that the proposed changes were free of a racially 
discriminatory effect. It is not necessary to hold that 
this allocation of the burden of proof by the Attorney 
General was his only possible choice under the Act, in 
order to find it a reasonable means of administering his 
§ 5 obligation. Any less stringent standard might well 
have rendered the formal declaratory j uclgment procedure 
a dead letter by making available to covered States a far 
smoother path to clearance. The Attorney General's 
choice of a proof standard was thus at least reasonable 
and consistent \vith the Act, and we hold that his ob-
jection pursuant to that sta11dard was lawful and effective. 
The appellant's final contention is that the Attorney 
General's objection to the 1971 plan was untimely, and 
so the submitted plan should have been held by the 
District Court to have gone into effect. It is far from 
clear that this claim is not simply moot, since the state 
enactment establishing the 1972 plan explicitly repealed 
the 1971 plan,0 and the objection to the 1972 plan was 
clearly within the statutory time period. In any event, 
the claim is without merit. 
In promulgating regulations, the Attorney General 
dealt with several aspects of the 60-day time limit estab-
lished by § 5 of the Act. The regulations provide that 
all calendar days count as pa.rt of the allotted period. that 
parties whose submissions are objected to may seek 
reconsideration on the basis of new information and ob-
tain a ruling within 60 days of that request, and that 
the 60-day period shall commence from the time the De-
partment of Justice receives a submission satisfying the 
enumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (c), (d), (b). 
In the present case, the Attorney General found the 
initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the 
regulations. Two weeks after receiving it, he requested 
0 Sec Ga. Srnate Bill 690, March 9, 1972. 
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additional information.' 0 His letter referred to 28 CFR 
~ 51.18, a regulation providing for a request for additional 
information, and noted the additional regulatory pro-
vision that the 60-day period would not commence until 
the information was received. The State did not submit 
the requested data until January 6, 1972. Under the 
above mentioned regulation the 60-day period com-
menced on that date, and the Department of Justice 
made its objection within 60 days- on March 3. 
The appellant argues that the Attorney General has 
granted himself more time than the statute provided by 
promulgating regulations suspending the time period 
until a complete submission is received. Here again, the 
question is whether the regulation is a reasonable ad-
ministrative effectuation of § 5 of the Act. The judg-
ment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult 
10 The lett er sent to the AttornC)' Gen<'ral of G0orgia stat0d that 
a " prdiminar)' examination " of the matl'rials submitted l0d the 
Dcparlmrnt of .Tustire to conclude '·that the dnta s0nt to the 
Attorney General arc in ~uffi c ient to evnlunt<' prop<'rly the changes 
.vou ha ,·c submitted. In accordnncr with Sections 51.10 (a) (6) and 
.'H.lS (n) of th<' Procedure~ for the Administration of Scrtion 5 of the 
Yoting Ri~ht ~ Act of 1965 ... would you pkn~c assist us by pro-
viding t his Department tho following ndditional information . ... " 
The promulgnt<'d rcgulntions defin<' in 28 CFR § 51.10 tho con-
tent s of a ~ubmission. § 51.10 (a) (6) states : 
" With rCS})ect to redistricting, nnncxation, nnd other complex 
changes, other information which the Attorney General determine:; 
is requir<'cl to enable him to evaluate 1 he purpoRo or effect of the 
change. Such otlwr informntion may include items listed under 
paragraph (b) of this section. When such other information is 
required, the Attornry Geneml shall notify the submitting authority 
in the manner provided in § 51.18 (a )." 
Section 51.10 (b) "strongly urges" submitting authorities to produce 
the information enumerated to tho extent it is avnilablc nnd relevant 
to the submitted changes. Virtunlly all of the information requested 
in this case, sec n. 4, supm, falls wi thin the cnum0rated catcgori<'s of 
§ 51.10 (b). 
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and complex one, and no one would argue that it should 
be made without adequate information. There is no 
serious claim in this case that the additional informa.-
tion requested was unnecessary or irrelevant to § 5 evalua-
tion of the submitted reapportionment plan.11 Yet if 
the Attorney General were denied the power to suspend 
the 60-day period until a complete submission were ten-
dered, his only plausible response to an inadequate or 
incomplete submission would be simply to object to it. 
He would then leave it to the State to submit adequate 
information if it wished to take advantage of this means 
of clearance under § 5. This result would only add 
acrimony to the administration of § 5. We conclude, 
therefore, that this facet of the Attorney General's reg-
ulations is wholly reasonable and consistent with the 
Act. 1 2 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court is affirmed. Since, however, elections were 
conducted under the disputed 1972 plan by reason of this 
Court's stay order, it would be inequitable to require new 
elections at this time. 
11 Sec n. 4, supra. 
1 ~ The appellant contends that to allow the Attorney General to 
promulga te thi ~ regulation is to open the way to fri\·olous and re-
peated delays by the Justice Department of laws of vital concern to 
the coYcred States. No such conduct by the Attornr~· General is 
presented here, and by U]Jholding thr basic ntlidity of the regula-
tion we most assured!~· do not prejudge any ease in which such 
unwarrant ed admini~tra tive conduct may be shown. Furthermore, 
a submission to the Attornry Genernl is not the excluHive mode of 
preclearance under § 5. If a State finds the Attorney General's 
drlays unreasonable, or if he objects to the submis~ ion , the State 
"m:ty still enforce the legislation upon securing :~ deelam tory judg-
men t in the District Court for the District of Columbia." Allen v. 
State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 549. 
72-75-0PINION 
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The case is remanded to the District Court with in-· 
structions that any future elections under the Georgia 
House reapportionment plan be enjoined unless and until 
the State pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, ten-
ders to the Attorney General a plan to which he does not 
object, or obtains a favorable declaratory judgment from 
the District Court for the District of Columbia. 
It is so ordered_ 
March 21 
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
The Attorney General of the United States brought 
this suit under § 12 (d) of the Voting Rights Act as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j (d), to enjoin the State of 
Georgia from conducting elections for its House of Rep-
resentatives under the 1972 legislative reapportionment 
law. A three-judge federal court in the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia agreed that certain aspects of the reap-
portionment law came \Yithin the ambit of § 5 of the Act, 
42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that the State, which is sub-
ject to the provisions of § 5/ had not obtained prior clear-
ance from either the Attorney General or the District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, and 
without reaching the question whether the reapportion-
ment plan had the purpose or effect of "denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," 
1 A State is subject to § 5 if it qua lifies under § 4 (b), 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973b (b). Covered States arc those which on November 1, 1964, 
employed any of several enumerated tc~ts or deYices as a prerequisite 
to voting, and in which J c~s than 50% of eligible voters were 
registered to vote or actually voted in the November 1964 pre~i­
dential election. States that meet identical criteria with respect to 
the 1968 presidential election are also covered under the amended 
Act. It is stipulated that Georgia is co>·ered under § 4 (b) . 
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42 U. S. C. § Hl73c, the District Court issued the re-
quested injunction." The State brought this appeal. We 
noted probable .i urisdiction, staying enforcement of the 
District Court j uclgmen t pending disposition of the ap-
peal. 409 U. S. 911. 
Following the 1970 Census, the Georgia Legislature set 
out to reapportion its State House of Representatives, 
State Senate, and federal congressional electoral districts. 
\Ve are here concerned only with the reapportionment 
plan for the State House of Representatives." The result 
of the Legislature's deliberations was a plan (hereinafter 
the 1971 plan) that, as compared with the prior 1968 
scheme, decreased the number of districts from 118 to 
105, and increased the number of multi-member districts 
from 47 to 49. Whereas the prior apportionment plan 
had generally preserved county lines, the 1971 plan did 
not: 31 of the 49 multi-member districts and 21 of the 
56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county 
boundaries. The boundaries of nearly all districts were 
changed, and in many instances the number of represent-
atives per district was altered. Residents of some 31 
counties formerly in single-member districts were brought 
into multi-member districts. Under continuing Georgia 
law, a candidate receiving less than a majority of the 
votes cast for a position was required to participate in 
a majority runoff election. Ga. Code§ 34-1513. And in 
the multi-member districts, each candidate was required 
to designate the seat for which he was running. referred 
to as the "numbered post." Ga. Code § 34-1015. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids States sub-
ject to the Act from implementing any change in a "vot-
ing qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice. or procedure with respect to voting" without 
" The deciciion of the District Court is umeported. 
" No objection was interposed with respect to the State Senate or 
fc•deral congrC'i'sional districts. 
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first. obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District 
Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed 
change "does not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on ac-
count of race or color," or submitting the plan to the 
Attorney General of the United States and receiving no 
objection within 60 days. 42 U.S. C.§ 1973c. Pursuant 
to this requirement, the State of Georgia submitted the 
1971 plan to the Attorney General on November 5, 1971. 
Two weeks later, a representative of the Department of 
Justice wrote to the State Attorney General, requesting 
further information needed to assess the racial impact 
of the tendered plan:' This information was received on 
January 6, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the Attorney 
General of the United States formally objected to the 
State's plan. The objection letter cited the combination 
of multi-member districts. numbered posts, m.ajority run-
off elections, and the extensive departure from the State's 
pr·ior policy of adhering to county lines. On the basis 
of these changes plus particular changes in the structure 
of potential black majority single-member districts, the 
Attorney General \\'aS "unable to conclude that the plan 
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." 
The letter stated that the Attorney General therefore felt 
obligated to "interpose an objection to changes submitted 
by the reapportionment plans." 
The State Legislature immediately enacted a new re-
apportionment plan and repealed its predecessor. The 
1972 plan increased the number of districts from 105 to 
128, and decreased the number of multi-member districts 
'1 The Ju~ ticc Drp[lrtmcnt [(~ked for rCIJ. 'Us map:-; of the 1964 and 
196H Hou~e di:-; trictR ; thr di~tribut ion of white and nonwhite popula-
tion within the 196-t, 1958, and 1971 di~ tri<'ts; :1 hi~t or.1· of the pri-
mary and general rlections in which 1\'r~ro r[lndidatr:; ran ; data, 
including rare, with rc:;pcct to all elected ~~ [l(C n·prcscnt nt i1·c~; and 
the legi~lnti1 ·e hi~tory of all redi~trirting bill><. 
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from 49 to 32. T"·enty-two of the multi-member districts 
and 37 of the single-member districts still crossed county 
boundaries. 
This 1972 plan was submitted to the Attorney General 
on March 15, and he objected on March 24. The Assist-
ant Attorney General's letter stated, in part: 
"After a careful analysis of the Act redistricting 
the Georgia House of Representatives, I must con-
clude that this reapportionment does not satis-
factorily remove the features found objectionable in 
your prior submission, namely, the combination of 
multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a ma-
jority (runoff) requirement discussed in my March 3, 
1972 letter to you interposing an objection to your 
earlier Section 5 submission. Accordingly, and for 
the reasons enunciated in my March 3, 1972 letter 
I must, on behalf of the Attorney General, object to 
S. B. 690 reapportioning the Georgia House of 
Representatives." 
When the Georgia Legislature resolved that it would 
take no further steps to enact a new plan, the Attorney 
General brought the present lawsuit. 
The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable 
to the 1972 House plan, both because the Act does not 
reach "reapportionment" and because the 1972 plan does 
not constitute a change from procedures "in force or effect 
on November 1, 1964." If applicable, the Act is claimed 
to be unconstitutional as applied. The State also chal-
lenges two aspects of the Attorney General's conduct of 
the § 5 objection procedure, claiming first that the At-
torney General cannot object to a state plan without find-
ing that it in fact has a discriminatory purpose or effect, 
and second that the Attorney General's objection to the 
1971 plan was not made within the 60-day time period 
allowed for objection under the Act. 
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Despite the fact that multi-member districts, numbered 
posts, and a majority runoff requirement were features 
of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964, the· 
cha11ges that follo\Yed from the 1972 reapportionment are 
plainly sufficient to invoke § 5 if that section of the Act 
reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5 is not 
concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, 
but rather with the reality of changed practices as they 
affect Negro voters. It seems clear that the extensive 
reorganization of voting districts and the creation of 
multi-member districts in place of single-member districts 
in certain areas amounted to substantial departures from 
the electoral state of things under previous law. The 
real question is whether the substance of these changes 
undertaken as part of the state reapportionment are 
"standards, practices, or procedures with respect to vot-
ing" within the meaning of § 5. 
The prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion 
that changes of the sort included in Georgia's 1972 House 
reapportionment plan are cognizable under § 5. In South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, we upheld the 
basic constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Mr. 
Justice Black dissented from that judgment, precisely 
describing the broad sweep of § 5: 
"Section 5 goes on to provide that a State covered 
by § 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or 
laws relating to voting without first trying to per-
suade the Attorney General of the United States or 
the Federal District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia that the new proposed la\\'s do not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying the 
right to vote to citizens on account of their race or 
color." 383 U. S., at 356 (concurring and dissenting 
opinion). 
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The applicability of § 5 to election law changes such 
as those enacted by Georgia in its 1972 plan was all but 
conclusively established by the opinion of this Court in 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544. The 
Allen opinion, dealing with four companion cases, held 
that § 5 applied to a broad range of voting law changes, 
and was constitutional as applied. With respect to the 
reach of§ 5, we held that "[t]he legislative history on the 
whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach 
any state enactment which altered the election law of 
a cover-ed State in even a minor way." I d., at 566. 
One of the companion cases, Fairley v. Patterson, in-
volved a claim that a change from district to at-large 
voting for county supervisor was a change in a "stand-
ard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." The 
challenged procedure was held to be covered by § 5. 
We noted that "[t]hc right to vote can be affected by a 
dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute pro-
hibition on casting a ballot. Sec Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)." ln holding that§ 5 reached vot-
ing law changes that threatened to dilute Negro voting 
po\\'er, and in citing Reynolds v. Sirns, we implicitly 
recognized the applicability of § 5 to similar but more 
sweE'ping p]ection la\Y changes arising from the reappor-
tionment of state legislatures. 393 U. S., at. 565-.566, 
583-586 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.). 
Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5 
in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. 
After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend 
the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case was 
repeatedly discussed," the Act was extended for five years, 
;; See, e. {! .. Hearings before Subcmmnittee No. 5 of the IIou~c 
Committre on the Judiciary on H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar 
Propo~nb, 9bt Cong., 1st Sess., ni 1, 4, 18, 83, 130-131, 133, 147-
14!), 154-15.5, 182-184, 402-454; Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Con~titutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
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without any substantive modificatio11 of § 5. Pub. L. 
91-285, 85 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). We can only conclude, 
then, that cillen correctly interpreted tho congressional 
design when it held that "tho Act gives a broad interpre-
tation to tho right to vote, recogni:dng that voting in-
cludes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.' >r 
39:3 U. S., at 565-566. 
Another measure of the decisiveness with which Allen 
controls tho present case is the actual practice of covered 
States since the Allen case was decided. Georgia, for ex-
ample, submitted its 1971 plan to the Attorney General 
because it clearly believed that plan "·as covered by § 5. 
Jts submission \vas "made pursuant to § 5," and the State 
Attorney General explained in his submission that tho 
1968 reapportionment of tho Georgia House of Repre-
sentatives "was not ~::ubmitted because at that time, prior 
to Allen v. Board of Elections, ... it \vas believed to be 
unnecessary to submit reapportionment plans to the 
United States Attorney General pursuant to the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965." When the Attorney General ob-
jected, Georgia changed its House plan and resubmitted 
it pursuant to § 5. Other States covered by the Act 
have also road Allen as controlling. Tho brief for tho 
United States advises us that as of December 1, 1972, 
381 post-Allen reapportionment plans had been presented 
to tho Attorney General by various States for§ 5 approval. 
In tho present posture of this case, tho question is not 
whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, includ-
ing extensive shifts from single- to multi-member districts,. 
on Hills lo Amend the Voting Hight:> Act, 91~t Cong., bt and 2d 
Sc~:;., at 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-391\, 426-427, 46!l DaYid 1. 
Norman, then Deputy Assi::>tant Attornry General. Cid Hight,; Di-
,·ision, tc~tifiPd that, "from court decil"ion~, all t hr:<r rrdist ricting 
plans nrr going to ha1·e to be submittrd to thr Attornr.1· Grnrral for 
hi!> npprontl bccau~c thry arc voting ch:tllgr~." Srnat c Hearings,. 
supm, at 507. 
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in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. 
The question, rather, is whether such changes have the 
potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and 
are within the definitional terms of § 5. It is beyond 
doubt that such a potential exists, cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 U. S. 124, 141-144. In view of the teaching of 
Allen,6 reaffirmed in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 
6 The appellnnt points to language in the Allen opinion that, it 
sn~·s, left oprn thr qur;;tion of the applicability of § 5 to :1 state 
rrapportionmrnt law. Thr cited passage in Allen is a~ follow;;: 
"Apprllrrs in No. 25 rFairley v. Patterson] also nrgur that 
§ 5 was not intended to apply to a changr from diHtric1 to nt-brge 
Yoting, bE'causr application of § 5 would cau~e a conflict in the 
ndmini~tration of rrapportionmE'nt legi:;lation. Thr~· contrnd that 
under such a broad reading of § 5, enforcemrnt of a reaPJ)Ortionmrnt 
plan could be rnjoined for failure to meet the § 5 approntl require-
men Is, even though the plnn lwei been approved by a federnl court. 
Appellees urge that Congress could not havr intended to force the 
Stales to submit a rrapportionment plan to two different courts. 
"Wr must reject a narrow construction that appellees would give 
to § 5 . . . . The argument that some administrative problem 
might arisr in the futme does not estn bli~h that Congress in I rnded 
I hat§ 5 have a narrow scope; we leave to another casr n considera-
tion of nny possible conflict." 393 U. S., at 564-565, 569. 
The caveat implicit in this language would support thr appellant's 
position only if practical problems of adminjstration had rmerged 
in thr period that has cl:1psed since Allen was decided. This does 
not appear to have bern the case. The brief of the Unitrd States 
advises us that the Departmrnt of Justice has adopted procrdures 
drsignrd to minimize any conflicts between § 5 administr::ttiYe reYirw 
::tnd fedrral court litigation based on Fourternth or Fiftrenth Amend-
mrnt attacks upon state reapportionment plans. Wherr a reap-
portionment plan has been prescribed by federal judicinl decree, 
thr Attorney General does not rrview it. Ser Conner v. Johnson, 
402 U. S. 690, 691. Whrre a plan has been submitted to the Attor-
ney General and is at the same time being litigated with resprct to 
a Fifteenth Amendment claim, the Attorney General hns drfrrrcd 
to the judicial detrrmination regarding racial di~crimination. Finally, 
the number of in~tnnce~ presrnting an administratiw-judicial overlap 
has been small. Of the 381 reapportionments submitted to the At-
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379, we hold that the District Court \YaS correct in de-
ciding that the changes enacted in the 1972 reapportion-
ment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives were 
within the ambit of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.' And 
for the reasons stated at length in South Caroli11a Y. 
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-337, we reaffirm that the· 
Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under· 
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
II 
By way of implementing the performance of his obliga-
tion to pass on state submissions under § 5, the Attorney 
General has promulgated and published in the Federal 
Register certain administrative regulations, 28 CFR §51. 
The appellant claims these regulations are without legis-
lative authorization, and objects in particular to the 
application in the present case of two regulations which 
set forth the standards for decision on submissions and 
more fully define the 60-day time period provided in the 
Act. 
It is true, as the appellant contends, that § 5 itself does 
not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any 
regulations. But § 5 is also silent as to the procedures the 
Attorney General is to employ in deciding whether or 
not to object to state submissions, as to the standards 
governing the contents of those submissions, and as to· 
torney General, only 19 of the objected-to submissions were involYed 
in litigation when submitted. 
7 Georgia has argued that § 5 approval is needed only with respect 
to those electoral districts in which a change in a ";;tnndard, practice, . 
or procedure with respect to voting" occurred. In an appropriate 
case a State might establish that a reapportionment plan left some 
districts unaffected by even a minor change with the potential for 
diluting the Yalue of the Negro vote. We do not decide whether 
Georgia could show the existence of any unaffected di;;tricts in this 
cat>e, and we leaye that issue for consideration by the District Comt 
on remand. 
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the meaning of the 60-day time period in ·which the At-
torney General is to object, if at all. Rather than read-
ing the statute to grant him unfettered discretion a.s to 
procedures, f'tanclards, and administration in this sensitive 
area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to form-
ulate and publish objective ground rules. If these regu-
lations arc reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting 
Rights Act itself, then 5 U. S. C. ~ 301, which gives to 
"[tlhe head of an Executive department" the power to 
"prescribe regulations for the government of his depart-
ment, . . . rand] the distribution and performance of 
its business ... ," is surely ample legislative authority 
for the regulations. Sec United States v. M oreltead, 243 
U. S. 607, Smith v. United States, 170 U. S. 372. 
In 28 CFR § 51.19, the Attorney General has set forth 
the standards to be employed in deciding whether or not 
to object to a state submission. The regulation states 
that the burden of proof is on the submitting party, and 
that the Attorney General will refrain from objecting 
only if his review of the material submitted satisfies him 
that the proposed change does not have a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or effect. If he is persuaded to 
the contrary. or if he cannot within the 60-day time 
period satisfy himself that the change is without a dis-
crilTtinatory purpose or effect, the regulation states that 
the Attorney General will object to the submission.8 In 
R 28 CFR § 51.19, in pert incnt part, ~tate~ that: " ... the bur-
drn of proof on thr ~uhmitting authority i~ the ~ame in ,uhmitlii\g 
change~ to t br Attorne.1· General ao; it would lw in ~ubmit ting changes 
to the Di~trirt Court for the Di~trict of Columbia. . . . U the 
Attorney General i~ sati~fied lh;lt the ~ubmittecl rhauge doc~ not 
han a rariall~· discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object 
to the change ;mel will so notify the submitting authority. If the 
Attome.1· Genrral determines that the submitted change has a racially 
di~criminatory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will 
so 11otify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the pur-
pose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General 
is unable to reso!l·e the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall, 
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objecting to the 1071 plan. the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral \\'rote that he was "unable to conclude that the plan 
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting." 
The objection letter to the 1072 plan did not specify a 
degree of certainty as to the plan's discriminatory impact, 
but instead stated that the new plan had not remedied 
the features found objectionable in its predecessor. 
Although both objections "·ere consistent with the 
Attorney General's regulations, the appellant in effect 
attacks the legitimacy of the regulation described above 
in contending that the Attorney General is \Yithout 
power to object unless he has actually found that the 
changes contained in a submission have a discriminatory 
purpose or effect. 
In assessing this claim, it is important to focus on the 
entire scheme of ~ 5. That portion of the Voting Rights 
Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered 
States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia holding that 
a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or 
effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the 
Attorney General "merely gives the covered State a rapid 
method of rendering a ne\\' state election law enforceable." 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 549. 
It is well established that in a declaratory judgment 
action under § 5. the plaintiff State has the burden of 
proof.!) What the Attorney General's regulations do is 
con1<i~tcnt with thr abo,·e-de~cribrcl burdrn of proof :1pplirable in 
thr District Com!, rnter nn objection and ~o notif~· the ~ubmitting 
authority." 
0 The \'C'I')' effect of § 5 \Yas to shift t hP burdrn of proof with 
rr~pcct to mrinl di1<crimination in voting. Rathrr than reCJuiring 
affectrd parties to bring suit to rhallrngr e1w~· changrd 1·oting 
practice, Stales subjec·t to § 5 wrrc rerptired to obtain prior clear-
:mre brforc propo:;C'd rhangrs could be put into cffrcl. The burdrn 
of proof is on "the areas f'eeking relief." South Carolina Y. Katzen-
bach, 31\3 U. S. 301, 335. 
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to place the same burden on the submitting party in a 
~ 5 objection procedure. Though the choice of language 
in the objection letter sent to the State of Georgia was 
not a model of precision, in the context of the promul-
gated regulations the letter surely notified the State with 
sufficient clarity that it had not sustained its burden of 
proving that the proposed changes were free of a racially 
discriminatory effect. It is not necessary to hold that 
this allocation of the burden of proof by the Attorney 
General was his only possible choice under the Act, in 
order to find it a reasonable means of administering his 
~ 5 obligation. Any less stringent standard might ·well 
have rendered the formal declaratory judgment procedure 
a dead letter by making available to covered States a far 
smoother path to clearance. The Attorney General's 
choice of a proof standard was thus at least reasonable 
and consistent with the Act, and ·we hold that his ob-
jection pursuant to that standard was la,vful and effective. 
The appellant's final contention is that the Attorney 
General's objection to the 1971 plan was untimely, and 
so the submitted plan should have been held by the 
District Court to have gone into effect. It is far from 
clear that this claim is not simply moot, since the state 
enactment establishing the 1972 plan explicitly repealed 
the 1971 plan/0 and the objection to the 1972 plan was 
clearly within the statutory time period. In any event, 
the claim is without merit. 
In promulgating regulations, the Attorney General 
dealt with several aspects of the 60-day time limit estab-
lished by § 5 of the Act. The regulations provide that 
all calendar days count as part of the allotted period, that 
parties \vhose submissions are objected to may seek 
reconsideration on the basis of new information and ob-
tain a ruling within 60 days of that request, and that 
10 See Ga. Senate Bill 690, March 9, 1972. 
0 • 
72-75-0PINION 
GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES 13' 
the 60-day period shall commence from the time the De-
partment of Justice receives a submission satisfying the-
enumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (c), (d), (b). 
In the present case, the Attorney General found the 
initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the 
regulations. T\YO \veeks after receiving it, he requested 
additional information.11 His letter referred to 28 CFR 
§ 51.18, a regulation providing for a request for additional 
information, and noted the additional regulatory pro-
vision that the 60-clay period would not commence until 
the information ·was received. The State did not submit 
the requested data until January 6, 1972. Under the 
above mentioned regulation the 60-day period com-
menced on that elate, and the Department of Justice 
made its objection within 60 days-on March 3. 
The appellant argues that the Attorney General has 
granted himself more time than the statute provides by 
11 The letter sent to the Attorne~' General of Georgia stated that 
a "preliminary examination" of the materials submittrd !C'd the 
Department of Justice to conclude "that the data sent to the 
Attorne~· General arc insufficient to evaluate properly the changes 
you have submitt<:>d. In accordance with Sections 51.10 (a) (6) and 
51.18 (a) of the Procedures for the Admini~trntion of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 ... would you please assist us b:> pro-
viding this Department the following additional information .... " 
The promulgated regulations define in 28 CFR § 51.10 the con-
tents of a submis::;ion. § 51.10 (a) (6) state~: 
"With respect to redistricting, annexation, and other complex 
changes, other information which the Attorney Cenrrnl det<:>rmincs 
is required to enable him to evaluate the purpose or effect of the 
change. Such other information may include it ems li~ted under 
paragraph (b) of this section. When such other information is 
required, the Attorney General ::;hall notify the submitting :mthority 
iu the manner provided in § 51.18 (a)." 
Section 51.10 (b) "strongly urge::;" submitting authoritic.; to produce 
the information enumerated to tl1c extent it i::; :wailablc and relevant 
to the submitted change;.;. Virtually all of the inform:tt ion requested 
in this case, sec n. 4, supra, falls within the cnumcratrd categories of 
§ 51.10 (b). 
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promulgating regulations suspending the time period 
until a complete submission is received. Here again, the 
question is whether the regulation is a reasonable ad-
ministrative effectuation of § 5 of the Act. The judg-
ment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult 
and complex one, and no one would argue that it should 
be made ·without adequate information. There is no 
serious claim in this case that the additional informa-
tion requested was unnecessary or irrelevant to § 5 evalua-
tion of the submitted reapportionment plan.' 2 Yet if 
the Attorney General were denied the power to suspend 
the 60-day period until a complete submission were ten-
dered, his only plausible response to an inadequate or 
incomplete submission "·ould be simply to object to it. 
He would then leave it to the State to submit adequate 
information if it wished to take advantage of this means 
of clearance under § 5. This result would only add 
acrimony to the administration of § 5. We conclude, 
therefore, that this facet of the Attorney General's reg-
ulations is wholly reasonable and consistent "·ith the 
Act.' 3 
1
" Sec n. 4, supra. 
'"The UJ1prll:mt contrndR thnt to allow the Attorne~· Grnrral to 
promulgate thi~ regul:dion i~ to open thr way to fri1·olou~ nnd re-
peated dcla~·s b~· the .Tustiec Drpartment of laws of 1·ital concern to 
tho coyered States. No such conduct by the Attornr~· Gcnrral is 
pre~rnted here, and b~· upholding thr ba;.:ir Ynliclity of the rcgub-
1 ion we most nssuredl~· do not prejudge an~· casr in whir·h such 
unwarranted ndrnini~tral i\'c conduct ma.1· be shown. Furl hcrmore, 
a submi":;ion to the Attornr~· Grnrral i~ not the exclu~iw mode of 
preclearance under § 5. If a Stalr find~ the Attornry General's 
dcln~·:; unreasonable, or if he objects to the submis:;ion, the State 
"m:t.l' still enforce the legislation upon securing a declaratory judg-
lll<'lll in the DiHtrict Court for the District of Columbia." Allen v. 
State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 549. 
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III 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court is affirmed. Since, however, elections were 
conducted under the disputed 1972 plan by reason of this 
Court's stay order, it would be inequitable to require new 
elections at this time. 
The case is remanded to the District Court with in-
structions that any future elections under the Georgia 
House reapportionment plan be enjoined unless and until 
the State pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, ten-
ders to the Attorney General a plan to which he does not 
object, or obtains a favorable declaratory judgment from 
the District Court for the District of Columbia. 
It is so ordered. 
I 
l 
wck/srJ lee 4/24/73 
No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 
of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.s. C. § 1973c, and that therefore 
Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into 
effect. It is indeed a serious Intrusion, incompatible with the 
basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a 
State to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, 
assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General 
should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its 
provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding 
rather than an ambivalent one. 
More fundamentally, I believe that the Court should reconsider 
-
its decision 1n South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.s. 301 (1966), \ 
upholding the constitutt.nality of § 5. As Mr. Justice Black stated 








officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness 
"distorts our constitutional structure of government. " 383 U. s. , 
1 
at 358. Nothing in the Fifteenth Amendnent serves to overturn the 
underlying premise of the federal system that the State legislative 
process is an independent one. The results of that process are 
of course subject to challenge in federal court and under federal 
law, but the requirement of prior screening by federal officials, 
executive or judicial, works a "revolutionary innovation in 
American government" Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 
585 (196 ) (opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan), an innovation which 
hobbles the state lawmaking process. 
The constitutional infirmities of § 5 have become ever 
more clear as this Court has expanded its scope. Mr. Justice 
Harlan had the better of the argument, it seems to me, when in 
Allen he contended that by its language and legislative history 
§ 5 was directed only against ''those techniques that prevented 
Negroes from voting at all". 393 U.S., at 585. The majority 
3. 
disagreed, and in Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), a 
companion case to Allen, ruled § 5 applicable to a change from 
district to at-large election of county supervisors. Two years later, 
1n Perkinf! v. Mat_lu~ws, 400 U.S. 379 (1971), § 5 was held to apply 
to changes in the location of polling places, to municipal annexation 
of adjacent areas, and to a change from ward to at-large election 
2 
of aldermen. 
Whatever the merit in the position that Congress had 
constitutional authority to order federal screening of such non-
essential "devices" and poll taxes or literacy tests, federal 
screening of the location of polling places, of reapportionment, 
and particularly of annexation is markedly more intrusive. The 
selection of polling places and the drawing of district boundaries 
are necessary aspects of a democratic electoral system -a state 
or political subdivision may move polling places for convenience 
or technological necessity; it may redraw boundaries to reflect 
shifts in population; and a municipality may annex outlying lands 
4. 
in order to secure the tax base necessary to cope with urban 
problems. Unlike the adoption of a poll tax or a literacy test, 
each of these changes is commonplace and some are unavoidable, 
both in the Stabls and subdivisions covered by the Act and in those 
3 
not covered. 
Because subsequent development vindicate the wisdom of 
Mr. Justice Black's view in Katzenbach2 I would hold § 5 of the Act 
unc onstttuUonal. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. More fully, Mr. Justice Black stated: 
"Section 5, by providing that some of the States 
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional 
amendments without first being compelled to beg 
federal authorities to approve their policies, so 
distorts our constitutional structure of government 
as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution 
between state and federal power almost meaningless. " 
~~th Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U.s., at 
358. 
2. While, as the majority points out, ante, p. 6-7, 
Congress may be thought to have acquiesced in Allen by reenacting 
the Voting Rights Act in 1970, I submit that the Court's 1971 
decision in Perkins placing annexation within the scope of § 5 
merits reexamination as a matter of legislative intent. 
3. In !llen, ~upra, Mr. Justice Black addressed the 
punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few states 
in a manner which he described as "reminiscent of old 
reconstruction days," going on to say that: "I had thought that the 
whole nation had long since repented of the application of this 
'conquered province' concept. " 393 U.s., at 595. 
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MR. Jus'l'ICE WHITE, dissenting. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides 
that a State may not put into effect any change in voting 
qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures 
until it either procures a declaratory judgment from 
the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color or sub-
mits the alteration to the Attorney General and an ob-
jection has not been interposed by that official during 
the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General 
interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March 
9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Rep-
resentatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the 
use of that plan on the ground that the State had ob-
tained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor 
that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5 
was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans 
and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportion-
ment from going into effect. 
I agree that in the light of our prior cases and con-
gressional reenactment ;t § 5, that section 1~ be held 
to ~1ent statutes. Contrary to 
the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney Gen-
eral did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5 
72- 7 5-DISSENT 
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and that there was therefore no barrier to the March 9 
reapportionment going into effect. 
It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act, 
which merely says that the State's modification will go 
into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objec-
tion, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official 
will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation 
and force the State into the District Court with the burden 
of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I can-
not believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon 
the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discre-
tion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the 
Attorney General would not be valid if that officer con-
sidered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 sub-
missions and simply decided to object to all of them, to 
one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with 
governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I 
think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General 
would play dog in the manger and refuse or plead his 
inability to make up his mind as to whether a proposed 
change in election procedures would have the forbidden 
discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reason-
able to assume that Congress expected the Attorney Gen-
eral to give his careful and good faith to § 5 submissions 
and witb.,in 60 days after receiving all information he 
deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the 
proposed change did or· did not have a discriminatory 
purpos~;.~r effect and if it did, to object thereto. 
Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since 
been upheld, South Carolina v:Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 
301 (1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign ~· 
State must subm1t 1 s eg1sla 10n to federal authonties 
before 1 may a ·e e ec . t is even more senous to in-
si~igation and carry the burden of 
proof as to constitutionality simply because the State 
has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently 
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low percentage of its citizens has voted in its elections. 
And why should the State be forced to shoulder that 
burden where its proposed change is so colorless that the 
country's highest legal officer professes his inability to 
make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object, 
must he not himself conclude that the proposed change 
will have the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a 
proper objection, the matter would take on a familiar ad-
versary cast; and there would then appear to be solid 
basis-at least the probable cause that a federal charge 
usually imports-for insisting on judicial clearance. 
Moreover, the issues between the State and the United 
States, as well as the litigative burden the State would 
have to bear, could be known and examined and intelli-
gent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the 
District Court. As it is, the State may be left more or 
less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely an-
nounce, rather grandly, that he is not at all convinced 
that the law submitted to him is not discriminatory. 
My idea as to the obligation of the Department of 
Justice with respect to a submission under § 5 is similar 
to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that 
provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can 
terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory 
judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been 
used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the 
section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must 
consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no 
reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device 
has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of 
the action. Thus, in even the far more important con-
text of determining whether a State is in any respect 
covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to 
object to a decree favorable to the State, must have rea-
son to believe, and so state, that tests or devices with 
the prohibited effect have been employed in the past. 
~-
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Surely, where the issue is not termination, vel non, but 
the purpose and effect of a single statute, regulation or 
other modification of voting procedures, it is not un-
toward to insist that the Attorney General not object 
to the implementation of the change until and unless he· 
has reason to believe that the amendment has the pro-· 
hibited purpose or effect. He should not be able to 
object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind 
or that the evidence is in equipoise. 
March 30, 1973 
No. 72-75 Georgia v . United States 
Dear Potter: 
I write merely to say that I have not yet decided what to do in 
this case. 
As I have stated on more than one occasion, I consider the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 - limited as it is to a handful of states rather 
than applying to the entire country -to be discriminatory and indefensible 
sectional rather than national legislation. I agree with Justice Black's 
dissent in Katzenbach. I have even stronger feelings as to Perkins, which 
extended - quite without justification in my opinion- the Act to annexation 
in a way that does grievous harm to the orderly development of urban com-
munities, certainly in states like Virginia . 
Yet, these are established precedents and in the end I will either 
join Byron's narrow dissent, or concur in the result reached in your 
opinion accompanied by a brief statement that I do so only by virtue of 
feeling bound by decisions with which I totally disagree. 
I will only add, lest I be misunderstood, that I would have no ob-
jec tion (constitutionally or from the viewpoint of protecting the rights of 
all citizens to vote) to a carefully drawn Voting Rights Act which applied 
uniformly to all fifty states. It should exclude apportionment and annexa-
tion, and also should eliminate the offensive requirement that- as Byron 
suggests - states, hat in hand, obtain the consent of the Attorney General 
or run the gauntlet of the federal court here in the District before an act 
of the state legislature may go into effect. The normal procedures avail-
able for testing the validity of state statutes should have sufficed. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
•. 
' 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion 
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. Justice 
White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious 
intrusion, incompatible in the most fundamental sense with the basic 
structure of our federal system, to compel a state to submit its 
legislation for review by federal authorities in advance of its effectiveness. 
As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney 
General should be required to comply with it explicitly and only when 
he makes an affirmative evidentiary finding rather than an ambivalent 
one. 
The constitutionality of this act, and particularly § 5 thereof 
has been upheld. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) • 
2. 
Subsequent decisions have extended the applicability of § 5 far beyond 
what rationally may have been thought to be its original intendment: 
To legislative reapportionments in Allen v. state Board of Elections, 
393 U.S. 544 (196_), and even to annexation, the racially neutral 
method long used (and often the only method available) of extending 
the boundaries of a city to ameliorate the inevitable economic and 
social problems of locking an urban community ucJb:laK within a 
prescribed area. Perkins v. Matthews, I 400 u.s. 379 (197_) 
Until such time as there may be a disposition of the Court to reconsider 
these far reaching decisions, they are precedents of this Court binding 
upon the states singled out by this Act and courts called upon to enforce 
the Act. As this is my first opportunity as a Justice of this Court 
to consider this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, I nevertheless deem 
it appropriate to record my deep conviction that Mr. Justice Black 
was profoundly right in his view that § 5 "distorts" the fundamental 
structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed by the 
Constitution. While his entire dissenting opinion is commended 
for those who wished to be reminded of the system of government 
intended to be established by the Constitution, I qucte only the 
following brief exert>ts: 
"Section 5, by providing that some of the States 
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional 
amendments without first being compelled to beg 
federal authorities to approve their policies, so 
distorts our c cmstitutional structure of government 
as to render any distint:tion drawn in the Constitution 
between state and federal power almost meaningless. 
* * * * 
"Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives 
federal officials power to veto state laws they do 
not like is in direct conflitt with the clear command 
of our Constitution that 'The United states shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government.' I cannct help but believe that 
the inevitable effect of any such law which forces 
any one of the State to entreat federal authorities 
in far-away places for approval of local laws :titJtp: 
before they can become effective is to create the 
impression that the State or states treated in this 
way are littleJDIIK more than conquered provinces." 
383 U. s. at 358-360. * 
*Mr. Justice Black made the relevant comment in one of his 
footnctes that: "The requirement that States come to Washington 
to their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply resented practices 
used by the English Crown in dealing with the American colonias." 
383 u.S. at 359, note 2. 
3. 
4. 
Lest I be misunderstood by some, I emphasize that I have 
no doubt whatever as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth 
Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights 
of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any 
way "on account of race, color or previous coodition of servitude. " 
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such 
legislation, indeed there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact 
that various means, both overt and more subtle, have been employed 
to deny voting rights edt on racial grounds, and these indefensible 
practices have been more prevalent in some states and section of 
our country than in others. 
My conviction that this particular act is unconstitutional is 
not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the 
professed objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in 
every state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my objecti'ons 
are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this \ 
act was drafted and the way it has been construed. It was written / 
not as the type of national legislation applicable to all states one 
would expect from the federal Congress, but to impose on a few 
states deemed to be the worst offenders limitations not made 
.,.. 
applicable to other states. In addition, as eloquently stated by 
Mr. Justice Black, § 5 of the Act is unprecedented in the sense 
of compelling the few states against which the Act is directed to 
seek, in advance, what in effect is an advisory opinion from the 
federal government: 
"It is hard for me to believe that a juHUkM> 
justiciable controversy can arise in the constitutional 
sense from the desire by the United states government 
or some of its officials to determine in advance what 
legislative provisions a state may enact or what 
constitutional amendments it may adopt." 383 U.S. 
at 357. 
5. 
*:tit th~i·subsequent case of Allen v. State Board of Electicns, 393 U.s. 
544, at 595, Mr. Justice Black addressed specifically the punitive 
nature of a federal statute which singles out a few states in a manner 
whicJt he described as "reminiscent of old reconstruct101Ul days", 
going on to say that: "I had thought that the whole nation had long , 
since repented of the application of this 'conquered province' concePt." 
Speaking more affirmatively, no one can doubt the correctness of 
Mr. Justice Black's further statement that the Constttution would 
never have been ratified, nor the original colonies ''willing to agree 
to a constitution that gave the federal government power to force 
one colony to go through such onerous procedure while all the other 
former colonies, now supposedly its sister states were allowed to 
retain their full sovereignty. Ibid at 596. 
B. 
Moreover, opinions of this Court have added gloss to the 
act hardly intended by the Congress. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting 
in ~!len, spoke of the "revolutionary innovation in American 
government" accomplished by the Court's ccnstruction of § 5. 
~lle.!l v. Bta:.!!J3.oa~d of Education, supra at 58 5. He went on to say: 
"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Aet] 
Congress moved only against those techniques that 
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did 
not attempt to restructure state governments. The 
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing 
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that 
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two 
provisions were designed t simply to interlock. 
* * * * 
"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more 
surprising in light of the Act1s regional application. 
For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals 
with a problem that is national in scope. I find it 
especially difficult to believe that CongrelBs would 
single out a handfult of states as requiring stricter 
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a 
problem that may well just as serious in parts of the 
North as it is in the South." 393 U.S. at 585, 586. 
In Perkins v. Matthews, a majority of the Court, following 
the logic of the earlier decisioo.s, further extended the Act to apply 
to changes (i) in location of polling of places; (ii) from ward to 
at-large election of town aldermen, and (iii) in municipal boundaries 
7. 
through annexation, bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi, 
a negligible number of new voters. * 
Harlan commented that ''the Court's opinion& 
ease are devoid of evidence of a legislative intent tt.. 
state's election law and to reach matters such as annexath. 
affect voting only incidentally and peripherally." Perkins, supra. 
at 398. 
Even in cases involving close and difficult questions of 
constitutional law, I normally feel tDall: bound to follow decisions 
of the Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority 
of the Court wished to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional 
question. There is often merit to finality of decision even with 
~'Three -separate, and minor changes, in the city's boundaries by 
annexation, were found to violate the Act. Oee of these added 46 
Negro voters, and no white voters; the second added 28 Negro 
voters and 187 white voters; and the final anne:xatim added 8 
Negro voters and 144 whites -making total of 82 new Negro voters 
and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of which 
totaled 2, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters, resulting -
in fact - in no alteration of the racial balance of voting strength. 
-~-~!klns, supra, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, at 403,404. 
8. 
respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially 
where - by legislation or idiiiDt" otherwise - our nation has adjusted 
to the decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed and 
never adequately answered by Justices Black and Jllldaii:i Harlan 
that the sustaining of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, 
do constitute such a "revolutionary innovation in American government"*· 
and 









*Mr-: Justic-e Harlan dissenting, Allen v. state Board of Elections, 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion 
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. 
Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportion-
ment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a 
serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic 
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a state 
to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming 
the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be 
required to comply with u; explicitly and to invoke its provisions 
only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an 
ambivalent one. 
has been upheld by a divided Court. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
2. 
383 U.S. 301 (1966). Subsequent decisions have extended the 
applicability of § 5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought 
to be its original intendment. See, e. g., Allen v. state Board of 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (196_). And in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 
U. S. 379 ( 197_), the reach of § 5 was stretched to include 
annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only 
method available) of extending the boundaries of a city l!li: to ameliorate 
the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban 
community within a prescribed area. Until such time as the Court 
may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they 
1-tJz_, 
are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce -ftftd 
~~. 
Act and upon the states singled out byJttte--AGt.Vf As this is my first 
opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and 
~ 
particularly § 5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction 
that 
that Mr. Justice Black was right in his view/l!li: § 5 "distorts" the 
fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed 
u 
by the Constitution. ~s-entire-dis~nting opinion is commended 
' . 3. 
to those who wish to refresh their understanding of the dual 
structure of government established by the Constitution. ~ 
~ Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt 
as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to 
enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens 
to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on 
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." 
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enach such 
legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensisitive to the fact that 
various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny 
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices 
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country 
than in others. 
My conviction that § 5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional 
is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the 
objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state 
and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my objections are 
4. 
based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this 
Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. It was written, 
in certain of its provisions, not as the type of national legislation 
applicable to all states one would expect from the Federal Congress, 
but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders 
2 
limitations and restraints not made applicable to other states. 
Moreover, in Perkins, supra, a~ majority of 
of the Court extended the Act to apply to changes (i) in location 
of polling places, (ii) from ward to at-large election of town 
aldermen, and (iii) in municipal boundaries through annexation, 
bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi, a negligible number 
of new voters. In dissenting
1
Mr. Justice Harlan commented 
that "the Court's opinions in both Allen and this case are devoid 
of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's 
election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which 
affecting voting only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins, 
supra, at 398. 
5. 
' 
I would have thought, until the Court spoke in Allen and 
Perkins, that Mr. Justice Harlan's point was unanswerable. The 
Act, by its language and history, was directed against the "tests 
and devices" and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and 
"poll taxes") employed most frequently, but not solely, in some 
of the southern states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But 
§ 5 has now been held to apply to conduct which is common to all 
of the states; to annexation and reapportionment, most significantly; 
but also to relocating polling :k places (a necessity as arm: population 
shifts within a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large 
elections of city or town councilmen (a reform in municipal 
government long recommended by leading authorities, especially 
for small and medium size communities), and to any shift from 
single to multi-member elections :mx of state legislators. These 
commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and non-
racial needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by discriminatory 





I normally feel i bound to follow prior decisions of the 
Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority 
wishes to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional issue. 
There is merit to finality of decision even with respect to a dubious 
resolution of a constitutional question, especially where -by~ 
~ legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the 
decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices 
Black and Harlan, and never adequately answered, that the 
and its expanded interpretation, 
5 
~~constitute a :X "revolutionary innovation in American government". 
6 









1. The essence of Mr. Justice Black's reasoning :im: is 
contained in the following excerpts from his opinion: 
a !JJ ' / 
' Section 5, by providing that some of the States 
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional 
amendments without first being compelled to beg 
federal authorities to approve their policies, so 
distorts our constitutional structure of government 
as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution 
between state and federal power almost meaningless. 
* * * * 
"Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives 
federal officials power to veto state laws they do 
not like i1 in direct conflict with the clear command 
of our Constitution that 'The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government. ' I cannot help but believe that 
the inevitable effect of any such law which forces 
any one of the States to entreat federal authorities 
in far-away places for approval of local laws before 
they can become effective is to create the impres-
sion that the State or States treated in this way are 
little more than conquered provinces. " 383 U. S. 
at 358-360. 1 
'!( ?<' ~ ><" 
Mr. Justice Black also Rl!llDIXJtH:H::el commented in one 
of his footnotes that: "The requirement that states come to 
Washington to have their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply 
resented practices used by the English Crown in dealing with the 




U Three separate, and minor changes, in the city's 
boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of 
these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second 
added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation 
added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro 
voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of 
which totaled 2, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters. The 
%HB result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial 
balance of voting strength. Perkins, supra, dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404. 
J ·
14 
In Allen, Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the 
"revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished 
by the Court's construction of § 5. Allen v. state Board of Education, 
supra, at 58 5. He went on to say: 
I 
"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act] 
Congress moved only against those techniques that 
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did 
not attempt to restructure state governments. The 
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing 
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that 
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two 








* * * * 
"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more 
surprising in light of the Act's regional application. 
For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals 
with a problem that is national in scope. I find it 
especially difficult to believe that Congress would 
single out a handful of states as requiring stricter 
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a 
problem that may well :jlx be just as serious in parts 
of the North as it is in the South. " 383 U. S. at 
585, 586. (Italics supplied) 
4. Who could suggest seriously, for example, that 
annexation or changing a JIDtnnUc precinct polling location in 
Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other 
city - might not "have the effect of denying or abridfu g the right 
t\ 
to vote on account of race" ( § 5) to the same extent as such an 
3. 
event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal 
overseeing of state and local legislative action. 
I 
' . 4. :m. 
5. Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. state Board 
of Elections, supra at 585. 
6. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture :bamiK 
:klitiDua before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis: 
"The place of stare decisis in constitutional law 
is even more tenuous. A judge looking at a con-
stituational decision may have compulsions to revere 
past history and accept what was once written. But 
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution 
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss 
which his predecessors may have put on it. So he 
comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some 
earlier ones as false and embracing others. He 
cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead 
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he 
lives do his thinking for him. 
"This re-examination of precedent in 
constitutional law is a personal matter for each 
judge who comes along. When only one new judge 
is appointed during a short period; the unsettling 
effect in constitutional law may not be great. But 
when a majority of a Court is ~
suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a 
substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettle-
ment until the new judges have taken their positions 
on constitutional doctrine. During that time -which 
may extend a decade or more - constitutional law 
will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence 
of our system and to my mind a healthy one. " 
The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949), 
pp. 152-179. 
lfp/ss lee 4/2/73 
No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion 
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. 
Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportion-
ment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a 
serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic 
structure of our system for federal authorities to compel a state 
to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming 
the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be 
required to comply with its explicitly and to invoke its provisions 
only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an 
ambivalent one. 
The constitutionality of this Act, and particularly § 5 thereof, 




. . 2 • 
383 U.S. 301 (1966). Subsequent decisions have extended the 
applicability of § 5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought 
to be its original intendment. See, e. g., Allen v. state Board of 
~~~tions, 393 U.S. 544 (196_). And in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 
U.s. 379 (197_), the reach of § 5 was stretched to include 
annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only 
method available) of extending the boundaries of a city :at to ameliorate 
the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban 
community within a prescribed area. Until such time as the Cour~ 
I 
may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they 
are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce and 
\ 
Act and upon the states singled out by the Act. As this is my first ' 
opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and 
particularly § 5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction 
that 
that Mr. tTustice Black was right in his view/ld § 5 "distorts" the 
fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed 
by the Constitution. While his entire dissenting opinion is commended 
/ 
to those who wish to ti!B refresh their understanding of the dual 
structure of government established by the Constitution. I will 
quote only the following excerpts: 
"Section 5, by providing that some of the states 
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional 
amendments without first being compelled to beg 
federal authorities to approve their policies, so 
distorts our constitutional structure of government 
as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution 
between state and federal power almost meaningless. 
* * * * 
''Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives 
federal officials power to veto state laws they do 
not like iS' in direct conflict with the clear command 
of our Constitution that 'The United states shall 
guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government. ' I cannot help but believe that 
the inevitable effect of any such law which forces 
any one of the states to entreat federal authorities 
in far-away places for approval of local laws before 
they can become effective is to create the impres-
sion that the State or States treated in this way are 
little more than conquered provinces. " 383 U. S. 
at 358-360. 1 
Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt 
whatever as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth 
3. 
Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights 
of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any 
way "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." 
4. 
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such 
legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact that 
various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny 
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices 
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country 
than in others. 
My conviction that this § 5 of this Act is egregiously 
unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement 
with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every 
state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, mya objections 
are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this 
Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. In was written, 
in certain of its provisions, not as to type of national legislation 
applicable to all states one would expect from the Federal Congress, 
rut to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders 
2 
limitations and restraints not mdde applicable to other states. 
In addition, as stated by Mr. Justice Black, § 5 of the Act is 
unprecedented in the sense of compelling the few states against 
5. 
which the Act is directed to seek, in advance, what in effect is an 
advisory opinion from the federal government as to validity of their 
legislative acts: 
II [rJt 
'« is hard for me to believe that a justiciable 
controversy can arise in the constitutional sense 
from the desire by the United states government 
or some of its officials to determine in advance 
what legislative provisions a state may enact or 
what constitutional amendments it may adopt. " 
383 U.S. at 357. 
Moreover, opinions of this Court have added gloss to the Act 
hardly intended by the Congress. In Perkins v. Matthews, a majority 
of the Court, following the logic of the :lldi: earlier decisions, extended 
the Act to apply to changes (i) in location of polling places, (11) from 
ward to at-large election of town alderman, and (iii) in municipal 
boundaries through »>iiiJJ!!IItB: annexation, bringing into the city of 
3 
Canton, Mississippi, a ~ negligible number of new voters. 
In dissenting Mr. Me Justice Harlan commented that ''the Court's 
opinions in both Allen and this ease are devoid of evidence of a 
legislative intent to go beyond the a•ltatiJa:a state's election law 
and to reach matters such as annexations, which affecting voting 
only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins, supra, at 398. 
,. 
6. 
In ~llen..z Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the 
"revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished 
by the Court's construction of § 5. Allen v. state Board of Education, 
supra, at 585. He went on to say: 
"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act] 
Congress moved only against those techniques that 
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did 
not attempt to restructure state governments. The 
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing 
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that 
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two 
provisions were designed simply to interlock. 
• • • • 
"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more 
surprising in light of the Act's regional application. 
Fo! the statute, as the Court now construes ita deals 
~ith a problem that is national in scope. I fin if 
especially difficult to believe that Congress would 
single out a handful of states as requiring stricter 
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a 
problem that may well jlx be just as serious in parts 
of the North as it is in the South. " 383 U. s. at 
585, 586. (Italics supplied) 
I would have thought, until the Court spoke in Allen that 
Mr. Justice Harlan's point was unanswerable. The Act, by its 
language and history, was directed against the ''tests and devices" 
and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and "poll taxes") 
7. 
employed most frequently, but not soley, in some of the southern 
states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But § 5 has now been 
held to apply to conduct which is common to all of the states; 
annexation and reapportionment, most SldrK significantly; but also 
to relocating polling places (a necessity as population shifts within 
a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large elections of city 
or town concilmen (a reform in municipal government long recom-
mended by leading authorities, especially for small and medium 
size communities), and to any shift from single to multi-member 
electioos of state legislators. These commonplace changes, often 
essential to meet neutral and non-racial needs, are not iDd.ea 
unique to the few states a:itJ singled out as the targets of this 
discriminatory legislation. They are as national in usage as state 
4 
and local government itself. 
In cases involving close and difficult questions of 
constitutional law, I normally feel bound to follow prior decisions 
of the Court with which I oa:iaqJia disagree unless and until at least 
8. 
a majority wishes to reexamine and reconsider the constitutional 
iuUilXJ.et issue. There is often merit to finality of decision even with 
respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional questim, especially 
where - by legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the 
decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices 
Black and Harlan, and never adequate answered, that the sustaining 
of '§ 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute a 
5 
"revolution innovation in American government". A reconsideration 
6 
of these cases is overdue. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Mr. Justice Black also IOIIJI'XIXCIIJIB commented in one 
of his footnotes that: "The requirement that states come to 
Washington to have their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply 
resented practices used by the English Crown in dealing with the 
American colonies. " 383 u.S. at 359, note 2. 
i / 
/ 2. In 
- 393 IL£.~ at 5'95, Mr. Justice Black addressed~ 
the punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few 
states in a manner which he described as "reminiscent of old 
reconstruction days", going on the say that: "I had thought that the 
whole nation had long since LepeEtaJI repented of the application of 
this 'conquered province' concept. ~o one can doubt the correctness 
of Mr. ~Tustice Black's further statement that the Constitution would 
never have been ratified, nor the original ~ Colonies 
"willing to agree to a constitution that 3t.vB gave the federal govern-
ment power to force one Colony to go through such onerous procedure 
while all the other former Colonies, now supposedly its sister states, 
J were allowed to retain tlllel:r full sovereignty." Ibid. at 596. 
2. 
3. Three spparate, and minor changes, in the city's 
boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of 
these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second 
added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation 
added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro 
voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of 
which totaled~, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters. The 
DB result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial 
balance of voting strength. Perkins, supr!r_ dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404. 
4. Who could suggest seriously, for example, that 
annexation or changing a px•••Kk precinct polling location in 
Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other 
city - might not "have the effect of denying or abriding the right 
to vote on account of race" ( § 5) to the same extent as such an 
event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal 
overseeing of state and local legislative action. 
3. 
5. Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. State Board 
6. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture :balm: 
»dJla:a: before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis: 
"The place of stare decisis in constitutional law 
is even more tenuous--:--A judge looking at a con-
stituational decision may have compulsions to revere 
past history and accept what was once written. But 
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution 
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss 
which his predecessors may have put on it. So he 
comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some 
earlier ones as false and embracing others. He 
cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead 
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he 
lives do his thinking for him. 
"This re-examination of precedent in 
constitutional law is a personal matter for each 
judge who comes along. When only one new ud 
is appointed during a short period, e unse ling 
effect in constitutional law may not be great. But 
when a majority of a Court is daaxsalblelf.tbyx 
suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a 
substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettle-
ment until the new judges have taken their positions 
on constitutional doctrine. During that time -which 
may extend a decade or more - constitutional law 
will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence 
of our system and to my mind a healthy one • ..!.' 
The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949), 
pp. 152-179. 
' . 4. 
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such 
legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact that 
various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny 
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices 
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country 
than in others. 
My conviction that tl;t6 § 5 of this Act is egregiously 
unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement 
with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every 
state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my» objections 
are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this 
Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. In was written, 
Hu.-
in certain of its provisions, not as~ type of national legislation 
A 
applicable to all states one \\U uld expect from the Federal Congress, 
but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders 
2 
limitations and restraints not made applicable to other states. 





~~ ----which=tl::l:e=A.ct is dit'cetea tie seck, in advance, what in effect is an 
A 
1-(._,z_ 
from the federal government as to validity of thci 
legislative acts: 
'''r' • I..•':J+ I 
- is hard fof me to believe at a justiciable 
controversy fan arise in t constitutional sc sc 
from the des rc by the U ted states govcrnm nt 
or some of it officials o determine in advanc 
what lcgislah c prov· ions a state may enact or 
what constitut na mcndmcnts it may adopt." 
383 U. S. at 357. 
I 
I Moreover, ourt have added gloss to the Ac 
hardly intended by the Congrcs . a majority 
the Act to apply to changes (i) in· location of polling places, (ii) from 
ward to at-large election of town alderman, and (iii) in municipal 
boundaries through~ annexation, bringing into the city of 
Canton, Mississippi, a ~gk negligible number of new voters. 
In dissenting Mr. ilk Justice Harlan commented that "the Court's 
opinions in both Allen and this case arc devoid of evidence of a 
legislative intent to go beyond thc~SJB: state's election law 
and to reach matters such as annexations, which affecting voting 
~ 
only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins, supra, at 398. 
7. 
employed most frequently, but not soley, in some of the southern 
states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But § 5 has now been 
held to apply to conduct which is common to all of the states; --/?::> 
annexation and reapportionment, most ~significantly; but also 
to relocating polling places (a necessity as population shifts within 
a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large elections of city 
or town concilmen (a reform in municipal government long recom-
mended by leading authorities, especially for small and medium 
size communities), and to any shift from single to multi-member 
elections of state legislators. These commonplace changes, often 
essential to meet neutral and non-racial needs, are not :iD::Bl 
rmique to the few state~'::1:.:!'J.e ~s ru this 
discriminatory legislation. They are as national in usage as state 
4 
and local government itself. 
In eases-involving close aHel diffiettlt-questimrs of 
Cf{ 
-eonstitut-i-onal-ta-w., I normally feel bound to follow prior decisions 
of the Court with which I~ disagree unless and until at least 
8. 
CL-
a majority wishes to reexamine and reconsider .tae constitutional 
~ issue. There is ~ merit to finality of decision even with 
respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially 
where - by legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the 
decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices 
Black and Harlan, and never adequate answered, that the sustaining 
of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute a 
"revolutio~ovation in American government". 5 A reconsideration 
1\ 
6 
of these cases is overdue. 
lfp/ss lee 4/2/73 
No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES 
~~(t-1-fj 
f///9)?3 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion 
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. 
Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportion-
ment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a 
serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic 
structure of our system/for federal authorities to compel a state 
to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming 
the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be 
required to comply with it~ explicitly and to invoke its provisions 
only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an 
ambivalent one. 
has been upheld by a divided Cour} South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
2. 
~c9-
383 U. S. 301 (1966~ A ,Subsequent decisions have extended the 
applicability of § 5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought 
to be its original intendment. See, e. g., Allen v. state Board of 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (196 ). A.mt_9n Perkins v. Matthews, 400 - ---
U.S. 379 (197_), the reach of § 5 was stretched to include 
annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only 
method available) of extending the boundaries of a city :&X to ameliorate 
the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban 
community within a prescribed area. Until such time as the Court 
may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they 
I 
)l_ i-1&--
are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce iiWiMi 
~ ~ 
opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and 
-~­
<.__ 
particularly § 5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction 
I 
that 
that Mr. Justice Black was right in his view/:&X § 5 "distorts" the 
fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed 
JJ 
by the Constitution. .\l'II.z:l~~~~~tl!i"ll!s~e=ntttui~!!.Ee.dwliriiiilii!SrEe~a.tibHi"~H!P€gFe9j_f'~H~1~~~""'~:*'~·,~, ~''IT~i~" §~iii:r:l~iEI&l~ 
/ 
3. 
rpml<'ll Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt 
as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to 
enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens 
to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on 
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. " 
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact' such 
legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensisitive to the fact that 
various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny 
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices 
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country 
than in others. 
My conviction that § 5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional 
is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the 
objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state 
and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my objections are 
4. 
based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this 
~~ 
Act was dFaft£!d and the way it has been constr~ It was wn 
LFP, Jr. :psf 4/19/ 73 Rider A, p. 4 Ga. v. U.S. 
As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal 
officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness 
"distorts our constitutional structure of government." Allen, 
supra, at 358. Moreover, the Act is unprecedented in the sense 
that it imposes on a few selected states, deemed to be the worst 
offenders, limitations and prior restraints not made applicable to 
2 
other states. 
of new voters. 
2 
In dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan commented 
that "the Court's opinions in both Allen and this case are devoid 
of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's 
election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which 
d 
affectiftg voting only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins, 
I 
supra, at 398. 
/ 




Perkins, that Mr. Justice Harlan's~ was unanswerable. The 
/\ 
Act, by its language and history, was directed against the "tests 
and devices" and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and 
"poll taxes") employed most frequently, but not solely, in som~e 
~~~ 
of the southern states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But 
§ 5 has now been held to apply to conduct which is common to all 
of the states; to annexation and reapportionment, most significantly; 
but also to relocating polling k places (a necessity as cqm: population 
shifts within a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large 
elections of city or town councilmen (a reform in municipal 
government long recommended by leading authorities, especially 
for small and medium size communities), and to any shift from 
single to multi-member elections m: of state legislators. These 
commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and non-
~ 
racial needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by discriminatory 
1\ 





I normally feel X: bmmd to follow prior decisions of the 
Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority 
wishes to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional issue. 
There is merit to finality of decision even with respect to a dubious 
resolution of a constitutional question, especially where -by ~ 
~legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the 
decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices 
Black and Harlan, and never adequately answered, that the 
I 
'8Jdoxtad:m sustaining of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, 
5 
~~constitute a x "revolutionary innovation in American government". 
A reconsid:::~:;:~:.~ 
2. 
;;. ~ Three separate, and minor changes, in the city's 
boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of ] 
these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second 
added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation 
added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro 
voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of 
which totaled 2, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters. The 
DB result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial 
balance of voting strength. Perkins, supra, dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404. 
*~In Allen, Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the 
"revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished 
by the Court's construction of § 5. Allen v. state Board of Education, 
supra, at 58 5. He went on to say: 
I 
"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act] 
Congress moved only against those techniques that 
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did 
not attempt to restructure state governments. The 
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing 
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that 
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two 






* * * * 
"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more 
surprising in light of the Act's regional application. 
For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals 
WITh a problem that is national in scope. I find it 
especially difficult to believe that Congress would 
single out a handful of states as requiring stricter 
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a 
problem that may well ~ be just as serious in parts 
of the North as it is in the South. " 383 U. S. at 
585, 586. (Italics supplied) 
? #. Who could suggest seriously, for example, that 
annexation or changing a :pxeRRHk precinct polling location in 
Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other 
' ' 
city - might not ''have the effect of denying or abriding the right 
I I 
' 
to vote on account of race" ( § 5) to the same extent as such an 
3. 
event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal 







Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. State Board 
of Elections, supra at 58 5. 
1. . Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture~ 
~ before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis: 
"The place of stare decisis in constitutional law 
is even more tenuous. A judge looking at a con-
stituational decision may have compulsions to revere 
past history and accept what was once written. But 
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution 
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss 
which his predecessors may have put on it. So he 
comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some 
earlier ones as false and embracing others. He 
cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead 
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he 
lives do his thinking for him. 
"This re-examination of precedent in 
constitutional law is a personal matter for each 
judge who comes along. When only one new judge 
is appointed during a short period; the unsettling 
effect in constitutional law may not be great. But 
when a majority of a Court is ~
suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a 
substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettle-
ment until the new judges have taken their positions 
on constitutional doctrine. During that time -which 
may extend a decade or more -constitutional law 
will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence 
of our system and to my mind a healthy one. " 
The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949), 
pp. 152-179. 
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MR. JUSTICE \\H ITE that the Attorney General did not comply 
with§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § l973c, and that 
therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been 
allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion, 
incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal 
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explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to 
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Footnote 
* As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal 
officials under § 5 of the Act to veto state laws in advance of their 
effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government." 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.s. 301, 358 (1966) (dissenting 
opinion). A similar appraisal was made by Mr. Justice Harlan, 
who characterized § 5, as construed by the Court, as "a revolu-
tionary innovation in American government." Allen v. Board of 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress 
under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to 
assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged 
or infringed in any way "on account of race, colo:x; or previous con-
dition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a power 
to enact such legislation, there is a duty. My disagreement is with 
the unprecedented requirement of advance review of state or local 
legislative acts by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by 
its selective application in only a few states. 
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides 
that a State may not put into effect any chango in voting 
qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures 
until it either procures a declaratory judgment from 
the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color or sub-
mits the alteration to the Attorney General and an ob-
jection has not been interposed by that official during 
the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General 
interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March 
9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Rep-
resentatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the 
use of that plan on the ground that the State had ob-
tained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor 
that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5 
was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans 
and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportion-
ment from going into effect. 
I agree that in the light of our prior cases and con-
gressional reenactment of § 5, that section must be held 
to reach state reapportionment statutes. Contrary to 
the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney Gen-
eral did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5 
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and that there was therefore no barrier to the March !) 
reapportionment going into effect. 
It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act, 
which merely says that the State's modification will go 
into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objec-
tion, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official 
will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation 
and force the State into the District Court with the burden 
of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I can-· 
not believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon 
the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discre-
tion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the 
Attorney General would not be valid if that officer con-
sidered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 sub-
missions and simply decided to object to all of them, to· 
one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with 
governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I 
think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General 
could discharge his statutory duty by simply sta.ting that 
he had not been persuaded that a proposed change 
in election procedures would not have the forbidden 
discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reason-
able to assume that Congress expected the Attorney Gen-
eral to give his careful and good faith to § 5 submissions 
and within 60 days after receiving all information he· 
deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the 
proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory 
purpose or effect and if it did, to object thereto. 
Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since· 
been upheld, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 
301 ( 1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign 
State must submit its legislation to federal authorities 
before it may take effect. It is even more serious to in-
sist that it initiate litigation and carry the burden of 
proof as to constitutionality simply because the State 
has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently 
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low percentage of its citizens ha,s voted in its elections. 
And why should the State be forced to shoulder that 
burden where its proposed change is so colorlc~s that the 
country's highest legal officer professes his inability to 
ma,ke up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object, 
must he not himself conclude that the proposed change 
w.ill ha,ve the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a 
proper objcetion, the matter would take on a, fmniliar ad-
versary cast; and there would then appear to be solid 
basis-at least the probable cause that a federal charge 
usua,lly imports-for insisting on juclicia,l clearance. 
Moreover, the issues bet,Yeen the State and the United 
Sta,tes, as well as the litigative burden the State would 
have to bear, could be known and examined a,nd intelli-
gent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the 
District Court. As it is, the State may be left more or 
less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely an-
nounce that he is not at all convinced that the law 
submitted to him is not discriminatory. 
My idea as to the obligation of the Department of 
Justice with respect to a submission under ~ 5 is similar 
to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that 
provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can 
terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory 
judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been 
used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the 
section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must 
consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no 
reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device 
has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of 
the action. Thus, in even the far more important con-
text of determining whether a State is in any respect 
covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to 
object to a decree favorable to the State, must have rea-
son to believe, and so state, that tests or devices with 
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Surely, where the issue is not termination, vel non, but 
the purpose ancl effect of a single statute, regulation or 
other modification of voting procedures, it is not un-
toward to insist that the Attorney General not object 
to the implementation of the change until and unless he 
has reason to believe that the amendment has the pro-
hibited purpol'e or effect. He ehould not be able to 
object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind 
or that the evidence is in equipoise. 
LFP,Jr.:psf 4/19/73 Rider A, p. 4 Ga. v. u.s. 
As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal 
officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness 
"distorts our constitutional structure of government." Allen, 
supra, at 358. Moreover, the Act is unprecedented in the sense 
that it imposes on a few selected states, deemed to be the worst 
offenders, limitations and prior restraints not made applicable to 
2 
other states. 
LFP,Jr . :psf 4/19/73 13 :fp_o~;lj~ Rider Ga. v. u.s. 
2. In Allen, supra, at 595, Mr. Justice Black addressed 
the punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few 
states in a manner which he described as r'reminiscent of old 
reconstruction days," going on to say that: "I had thought that 
the whole nation had long since repented of the application of 
this 'conquered province' concept." 
,. 
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opinion). A similar appraisal was made by Mr. Justice Harlan 
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Elections , 393 U.s. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress 
under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to 
assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged 
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legislative acts by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by 
its selective application in only a few states. 
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Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
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Memo to: William C. Kelly 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
,,. 
i·. 
Here is a draft of a proposed opinion concurring in Mr. 
Justiee White's diseent in the above case. , .. ,. 1'; 
·$.if p; i ,; ·,~ 'l·\ ~ 
,"' ,.~ 
would welcome your· comments and suggestions. 
,.. ' .1. ( <.ip 
1 1· • - • ~H. 
I ~ve 'not'"ch,eeke-d citations and quotations sinee dic-
tattug tbe draft. ,,, ' ' ·, 
Dear Byrm: 
"'lj. 
· - Please join me 1n your dissent, which I am supplementing by 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with 
MR. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not 
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is 
indeed a serious intrusion , incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel 
a State to submit its legislation for advance rcview_;f 
-:(·As Mr. Jnsi irr Bln.rk statrd, thr ]1owcr vesird in frdrral officials 
under § 5 of thr Art to wto ~tate laws in ad\·ance of their effec·tive-
ness "distorts our ron~tituiional ~trurture of goYernmenL" South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 3S3 U.S. :301, 358 (1966) (di;;srnting opin-
ion). A similar nppraiHal was mnde by Mr. Justice IIarLm, who 
characterized § 5, as ronHirurd b~· the Court, a~ "a rrvolntionary 
innovation in Americnn gO\·ernment." Allen v. Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dissenting 1n 
part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congre~~ unclrr ibe 
Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropria1 e legi~lation i o nssure that 
the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or in-
fringed in any way "on nccount of rare, color, or previous ronditi011 
of servitude." Indeed, in m~' Yiew there is morr thnn a power to 
enact such legi~laiion, tlwrr is n duty. 1\Iy cli~agreement is with tbe 
unprecedented rrqu irement of ad va nce rr view of state or local lrgisla-
tive acts by federal authorities, rrnderrd the more noxious hy its' 
selective application in only a few States. 
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As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, 
the Attorney General should be required to comply with 
it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is 
able to make an affirmative finding rather than an 
ambivalent one. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with 
MR. JusTICE WnrTE that the Attorney General did not 
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should hnve been allowed to go into effect. It is 
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel 
a State to submit its legislation for advance review:x .. 
·X·As Mr . .Just irr Black st~trcl, the powrr \r~trcl in frdrrnl r· ffi r ial::; 
under§ 5 of thr Art to \'0to ~ tatr law~ in ad·:all('r of thrir pffrcti,·e-
ncss " cli::;tort s om ron~t itut ionnl ~t rurturr of govrrnmrn t." South 
Carolina v. Katzenbarh, :ls3 U. F-l. 801, 8.58 (1966) (cli~srnting opin-
ion). A similar ~pprai~al wa~ made b~· Mr . .Ju ~t i rr Harl:in , who 
charartrrizrd § 5, a;; con~t nH'd by t hr Court. aH "a revolut ion:uy 
innovation in Amrriran grn·rl'Jllllrnt." Allen \'. Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544, 58.5 (1969) (comurring in part a nd di~srnting in 
parL). I ha\'0 no doubt a~ to t hr powrr of t hr Congrr~~ undrr the 
Fifteenth Amrnclmcnt to rnnct :l]lpropri:ltr lrgi~lntion to nssurr that 
the rights of citizrllH to votr :-;hall not br drnircl , nbridgrcl or in-
fringed in any way "on arronnt of rnrr , color, or prrviou~ condition 
of servitude." Indred , in m~· 'iew thcrr iR morr thnn a powrr to 
enact ,;uch lrgi~l ation, there i~ a duty. :\f~· clis:1grrrment i ~ with the 
unprecedentrcl requirrmrnt of aclnmcp rr,·ipw of :-;tate or lrwnl kgi~la­
tivc act::; by fcdrral anthorit ies, rrnclerrd thr more noxiou,; by its 
selective application in only a few Slates. 
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MR. J usTICE Po\·VELL, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with 
MR. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not 
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is 
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel 
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.* 
-x·As Mr . .Justice Black ;;tated, thr power YCHted in federal dfirial~ 
under§ 5 of the Act to wto ~tate law~ in advame of their PiTrcti,·e-
ne~s "d i~tort~ our con:stitntional ~true! ure of govrrnment." South 
Carolina v. Katzrnbach, :3R3 U. R. 30J, 35R (10G6) (di~srnting opin-
ion). A similar apprnisal was made U)' Mr. Justiee Ilrlrlnn , who 
characterized § 5, as con~t rued by the Court, as "a rrYolutionary 
innovation in Amrriran gowmmrnt .'' Allen ,._ Board of Elrctions, 
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (comnrring in part and dissenting in 
part). I have no doubt a~ to thr powrr of the Congress undrr t hr 
Fifteenth Amendmrnt to ennrt nppropri~1te legi~lation to as~mr that 
the right~ of citizens to \'Ole shall not br denied. :~bridged or in-
fringed in any way "on account of rare, color, or prrvion~ cnndition 
of servitude." Indeed, ii1 my view there i~ more than n power to 
enact such legi~htion, there is a dut~-- My di~ngrc•emrnt i~ with the 
unprecedented requirement of ad,·,mce revie-w of Htntc or local legi~la­
tivc actH by federal authorit ic;;, rendered the more noxious by Its 
selective application in only a few Slates. 
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the Attorney General should be required to comply with 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with 
MR. JusTICI~ Wrrrm that the Attorney General did not 
comply with ~ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c, ancl that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is 
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel 
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.'" 
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Fiftemih Amrnclml'nt to rnal't appror1r i;1tr l rg i ~hti0n to assmr that 
the rights of citizpn;; to I'OlC' ~<hall not bl' drniPd, abridgNl or in-
fringed in any way "on ~H·rount of rarr, color, or prl'vious condition 
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enact such ll'gisbtion, thC'rC' is a dut~·. l\T~· clisag;n•rml'ni is with the 
unpreccckntccl rrquirl'mrnt of adnmcC' n•vi<•w of slatP or lornllcgi~la­
tivc act~:> by fccl('J'a] authoritic::;, rcncl('l'rcl till' more noxious by its 
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As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, 
the Attorney General should be required to comply with 
it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is 
able to make an affirmative finding rather than an 
ambivalent one. 
.; 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr . Jt·:::;ttce Douglas 
Mr . • ":"u:::;~ice Brennan 
l!r. Juo t: c;J Stow 1rt 
Hr . .-:-t·SL . .:.-::e l'_·rr.h::~ ll 
:r. uUbtice Blackmun 
~ .• i·uo lice lo1 e:U 
tr. <'u::::Uco Eolmquist 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATmrorn: White ' J. 
Circulated : 
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Rec j_rculated :!i:.::._~ 
On Appeal from the United Georgia et al., Appellants, 
v. 
United States. 
States District Court for 
the Northern District of 
Georgia. 
[April -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JusTICE PowELL 
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l' join, dissenting. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides 
that a State may not put into effect any change in voting 
qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures 
until it either procures a declaratory judgment from 
the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color or sub-
mits the alteration to the Attorney General and an ob-
jection has not been interposed by that official during 
the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General 
interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March 
9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Rep-
resentatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the 
use of that plan on the ground that the State had ob-
tained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor 
that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5 
was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans 
and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportion-
ment from going into effect. 
I agree that in the light of our prior cases and con-
gressional reenactment of § 5, that section must be held 
to reach state reapportionment statutes. Contrary to 
the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney Gen-
' . 
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eral did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5 
and that there was therefore no barrier to the March 9 
reapportionment going into effect. 
It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act, 
which merely says that the State's modification will go 
into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objec-
tion, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official 
will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation 
and force the State into the District Court with the burden 
of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I can~ 
not believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon 
the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discre-
tion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the 
Attorney General would not be valid if that officer con~ 
sidered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 sub-
missions and simply decided to object to all of them, to 
one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with 
governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I 
think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General 
could discharge his statutory duty by simply stating that 
he had not been persuaded that a proposed change 
in election procedures would not have the forbidden 
discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reason-
able to assume that Congress expected the Attorney Gen-
eral to give his careful and good fait:;,\to § 5 submissions 
and within 60 days after receiving all information he 
deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the 
proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory 
purpose or effect and if it did, to object thereto. 
Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since 
been upheld, South Carolina v . .Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 
301 (1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign 
State must submit its legislation to federal authorities 
before it may take effect. It is even more serious to in-
sist that it initiate litigation and carry the burden of 
proof as to constitutionality simply because the State 
-
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has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently 
low percentage of its citizens has voted in its elections. 
And why should the State be forced to shoulder that 
burden where its proposed change is so colorless that the 
country's highest legal officer professes his inability to 
make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object, 
must he not himself conclude that the proposed change 
will have the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a 
proper objection, the matter would take on a familiar ad-
versary cast; and there would then appear to be solid 
basis-at least the probable cause that a federal charge 
usually imports-for insisting on judicial clearance. 
Moreover, the issues between the State and the United 
States, as well as the litigative burden the State would 
have to bear, could be known and examined and intelli-
gent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the 
District Court. As it is, the State may be left more ot· 
less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely an-
nounce that he is not at all convinced that the law 
submitted to him is not discriminatory. 
My idea as to the obligation of the Department of 
Justice with respect to a submission under § 5 is similar 
to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that 
provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can 
terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory 
judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been 
used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the 
section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must 
consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no 
reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device 
has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of 
the action. Thus, i11 even the far more important COli-
text of determining whether a 8tate 1s in any respect. 
covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to 
object to a decree favorable to the State, must have rea-
son to believe, ancl so state, that tests or devices with 
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the prohibited effect have been employed in the past. 
Surely, where the issue is not termination, vel non, but 
the purpose and effect of a single statute, regulation or 
other modification of voting procedures, it is not un-
toward to insist that the Attorney General not object 
to the implementation of the change until and unless hP 
has reason to believe that the amendment has the pro-
hibited purpose or effect. He should not be able to 
object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind 
or that the evidence is in equipoise. 
·J:O: 'l'he Chief' Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Juc t -; co B::.'cnnan 
Mr. J uct ~ (' ~; l;owe.rt 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with 
MR. Ju sTICE WHITg that the Attorney General did not 
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is 
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system. for federal authorities to compel 
a State to submit its legislation for advance review:x· 
->:·As Mr. .Ju:;tice Black ~tatrd, thr powrr vr~trd in frdrral officials 
under§ 5 of the Act to Hto st:1te law~ in aclvancp of thrir rffrctive-
ness "cli:;torts our conHtitutional H(ructure of govrrnment." South 
Carolina v. Katzrnbach, 8R8 U.S. 801 , :35R (19GG) (clissrnti ng opin-
ion). A ~imilar appraiHal was made b~- Mr . .Ju:;tice Harlan, who 
characterized § 5, ns constrned by the Court, as "a rrvolutionary 
innovation in American government." Allen v. Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and cli~~enting in 
part). I havr no doubt aH to the ]HJwrr of the Congre~:-: under the 
Fifteenth Amendment to enact ap]lropriatr lrgi~lation to n~:-;urr that 
the right~ of citizens to Yote ,;hall not be drnied, nbridged or in-
fringrd in any way "on account of race, color, or previouH cone! it ion 
of servitude." Indeed, in my view there i:< more than n power to 
enact Huch legi:<lation , there iH a duty. ;\T~ - di.~ngreement is with the 
unprecedented requirement of advanre review of state or locnllegi:<la-
tivc acts by fcdrrnl authorit ies, rendered the more noxious by its 
selecLive application in only a few States. 
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As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, 
the Attorney General should be required to comply with 
it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is 
able to make an affirmative finding rather than an 
ambivalent one. 
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On Appeal from the United 
,Georgia et al., Appellants, States District Court for 
v. the Northern District of 
.United ' States. Georgia. 
[May -,, 1973] 
.MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER, concurring. 
I concur in the result reached by the Court but I do 
so under the mandate of Allen v. Stale Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544 (1~9). I have previously expressed my 
.reservations as to the correctness of that holding. See 
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 397 (1971) (BLACK-
;J'v.IUN, J., concurring). 
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No. 72-75 
On Appeal from the United 
Georgia et al., Appellants, States District Court for 
v. 
United States. 
the Northern District of 
Georgia. 
[May 7, 19731 
MIL JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in his opinion , I agree with 
MR. Jus'l.'ICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not 
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is 
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system. for federal authorities to compel 
a State to submit its legislation for advance review::-
.:·As Mr . .JnRtice Black stated, the power vested in federal official~ 
1mdcr § 5 of the Act to veto f'tatc law· in mh·ance of their effective-
ll<'~S "di~tort:; our con~titutionnl structure of government." South 
Carolina,._ Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 (1966) (cli~scnting opin-
ion). A o:imibr appraif'al was made b~· Mr. Just ice II:trbn, who 
characterized § 5, as constrned by the Comt, as "a re,·olution:u~­
innoYation in Americnn govemment." Allen v. Board of Elrctions, 
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and di~:;e ntin!!: in 
part). I h:n-e no doubt as to the power of the Congre~s under the 
Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to n~snre that 
ihe rights of citizens to vote shall not he denied , a bridged or ill-
fringed in an!' way "on a,ccount of race, color, or previous condition 
of sen ·itudc." Indeed, in my view there i:; more than n power to 
enact such lcgi;;lution, there iR a duty. My di~agreement is with the 
nnprecedcnted requirement of acl,·ance review of state or locallegi...:la-
til·e acts by federal anthoritics, rendered the more noxious by its 
sclecti\·e application in only a few States. 
' . 
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~ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment 
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is 
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system. for federal authorities to compel 
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.~~ 
->:·As l\Ir. Justice Black sta ted, the power vested in federal offici:tls 
1mdrr § 5 of the Act to veto ~tate Jaws in a<.lnmce of their effectiw-
Jie~s "di~torts our con;; I ilutional st rurture of government." Soul h 
Carolina Y. Katzenbach, 388 U. S. 301, 358 (1966) (di~senting opin-
ion). A similar apprai~al was made by Mr. Justice Harlan, who 
chnractcrized § 5, as construed by the Court, as "a rm·olutionnry 
innovntion in American p;on:rnment." Allen v. Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544, 5R5 (1969) (concurring in part and di~::;entinp; in 
part). I haw no doubt as to the power of I he Congress under the 
Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriat<' lrp;i~latiou to nssme that 
the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridg<'d or in-
fringed in an:-.· way "on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of srn ·itude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a 11ower to 
<'mct such legi~lation, there is a duly. l\'Iy clisagr<'ement i~ with the 
unprecedented requirement of adnmce revirw of state or locnllegi.,;la-
tive acts by federal authorities, rendered the morr noxiou~ hy it s 
selective application in only a few States. 
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393 U. S. 544, 5,'5 (1969) (concurring in parl and cli,::;rnling in 
11art). I ha1·e no doubt as to the power of the Congrc~s under tlw 
Fiflrenth Amendment to enact appropriatr legislation to a~sure that 
thr rights of citizens to vote shall not be denird, abridged or in-
fringrd in any way "on account of race, color, or previous condition 
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